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Abstract
This paper examines optimal redistribution in a model with high and low-skilled individuals with
heterogeneous tastes for labor, that either work or not. With such double heterogeneity, it is well
known that traditional Utilitarian and Welfarist criteria suﬀer serious flaws. As a response, several
other criteria have been proposed in the literature. We compare the extent to which optimal
policies based on diﬀerent normative criteria obey the principles of compensation (for diﬀerential
skills) and responsibility (for preferences for labor). Unsurprisingly, the criteria from the social
choice literature perform better in this regard than the traditional criteria, both in first and second
best. More importantly, these equality of opportunity criteria push the second best policy away
from an Earned Income Tax Credit and in the direction of a Negative Income tax.
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1 Introduction
Assuming labor supply along the participation (also called extensive) margin implies that a larger
transfer towards low-paid workers than inactive people, i.e. an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
may become part of an optimal tax system (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002; Brewer et al. (2008);
Choné and Laroque, 2009). This well-known result is obtained under Utilitarian social preferences
while agents diﬀer in terms of skills as well as preferences. However, it is commonly admitted that
preference heterogeneity poses ethical questions which challenge standard objective functions like
Utilitarianism, see, e.g., Rawls (1971), Sen (1980) and Dworkin (1981). Other normative criteria
based on fairness requirements have been proposed in the social choice literature. However, they
are scarcely used to derive optimal tax policies. The optimal income tax literature itself considers
alternative social preferences but always with labor supply along the intensive margin. For instance,
Boadway et al. (2002) use a Utilitarian social welfare function where diﬀerent weights can be
assigned to individuals with diﬀerent preferences for leisure. This amounts to using diﬀerent
cardinalizations of individual utility functions. Paternalistic criteria, in which the planner uses a
reference value for the taste for work and maximizes the sum of these adjusted utilities have also
been considered, by, e.g. Schokkaert et al. (2004). Assuming high and low-skilled agents with
heterogeneous tastes for labor, labor supply along the participation margin, this paper compares
the optimal tax policies under a large set of social preferences from the social choice and the optimal
taxation literature. We show that the social choice inspired criteria provide an additional argument
for an optimal tax system away from the EITC. A lower transfer towards low-paid workers than
inactive people, i.e. a Negative Income Tax (NIT), is more likely to become optimal. Moreover,
under the assumption that the low-skilled have at least as large a participation elasticity as the
high-skilled agents, the labor supply distortion for the highly skilled is tempered.
The second contribution of this paper is to check the optimal tax policies against equality
of opportunity requirements. The dominant branch of the equality of opportunity literature,
liberal egalitarian theories of justice, argues that income or welfare inequalities arising from non-
responsibility factors such as innate skills should be eliminated (the compensation principle) and
inequalities arising from responsibility factors such as preferences should be respected (the respon-
sibility principle).1 These two principles characterize the equality of opportunity approach, see
Fleurbaey (1995a) and Bossert (1995). This paper then checks the optimal schedules we obtain us-
ing the criteria from social choice and also the ones from the optimal income tax literature against
the compensation and responsibility principles. Unsurprisingly, the criteria which originate from
the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much better than the traditional
criteria, both under full and asymmetric information. Under the latter assumption, we also con-
sider an alternative strategy that restricts the search for an optimal tax policy satisfying one of
the equality of opportunity principles.
The third contribution is to propose five new normative criteria which satisfy priority (and
thus weak) versions of the compensation and responsibility principles. They rely on a cardinal or,
alternatively, on an ordinal measures of welfare. We show that these criteria, just like the social
choice inspired criteria push the optimal tax away from an earned income tax credit and temper
1For an overview of this literature, see Fleurbaey (2008) or Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2009).
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the labor supply distortion of the highly skilled.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model, provide the character-
ization of the individuals’ behavior, and describe the decision variables of the government under
full and asymmetric information. Section 3 states the axioms behind equality of opportunity and
presents the distinct objective functions. Section 4 investigates the optimal tax policies under full
information, which is in Section 5 extended to the asymmetric information economy. Suﬃcient
conditions for a NIT or a EITC are given. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are gathered
in appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Individual behavior
Assume agents decide whether to work or not.2 They diﬀer along two dimensions: their skill and
their disutility of work. Skills take two values, wH > wL > 0, which correspond with the wages
given that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. The disutility of work, α, is
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (α) : R+ → [0, 1] : α → F (α) and
the corresponding density function f(α). The latter is continuous and positive over its domain.
These functions are common knowledge. The proportion of low-skilled agents (or wL-type) in the
population is given by γ, 1− γ is the proportion of high-skilled people (or wH-type). We assume
that productivity and labor disutility are independently distributed. Utility is quasilinear and
represented by:
v(x)− α if they work,
v(x) if they do not work,
where x is consumption, v (x) : R+ → R : x→ v (x) with v0 > 0 ≥ v00 and limx→∞ v0(x) = 0.
2.2 The government’s decisions
Under full information (so-called first best), the government implements a tax policy depending on
α and wY (Y := L,H) hence it also assigns individuals to low-skilled jobs (where the gross wage
is wL), to high-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is wH) or to inactivity (activity u). Activity
assignment is captured through the functions δL (α) : R+ → {0, 1} : δL (α) = 1 (δL (α) = 0) if
wL-agents with this value for α are employed (inactive) and δH (α) : R+ → {0, 1} : δH (α) =
1 (δH (α) = 0) if wH-agents with this value for α are employed (inactive). As a consequence
nL
def≡
R∞
0
δL (α) dF (α) (nH
def≡
R∞
0
δH (α) dF (α)) is the fraction of wL-agents (wH-agents) that
are employed. wL-agents cannot get access to high-skilled jobs, and, since eﬃciency matters, it
will never be optimal that wH-agents work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-
skilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase someone’s
consumption. Hence, formally, the government determines four consumption functions: xwL (α) for
the wL-workers, xwL (α) for the wH-workers, x
u
L (α) for the wL-inactive agents and x
u
H (α) for the
wH-inactive. All these functions go from R+ to R+.
2There is growing evidence that the extensive margin matters a lot, e.g. Meghir and Philips (2008).
2
The Government budget constraint can be formulated as follows:
γ
·Z ∞
0
[δL (α) (wL − xwL(α))− (1− δL (α))xuL(α)] dF (α)
¸
(1)
+(1− γ)
·Z ∞
0
[δH (α) (wH − xwH(α))− (1− δH (α)))xuH(α)] dF (α)
¸
≥ R,
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement, which can be positive or negative. This budget
constraint must be binding at the optimum as all government objectives considered in the paper
are increasing in individuals’ consumption.
The problem for the government in the first best is to determine the functions xwL(α), x
w
H(α),
xuH(α), x
u
L(α) together with δL (α) and δH (α) that are normatively desirable and satisfy the
government budget constraint (1).
In the second best, the tax schedule can depend only on income levels (0, wL or wH). The
government then defines three consumption levels xu, xL and xH , denoting consumption levels
when not participating in the labor force, when working in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs,
respectively. These consumption levels have to meet the government budget constraint, the set of
self-selection constraints (which will be stated in Section 5) and have to be normatively desirable.
The next section discusses which normative principles or criteria the government can use.
3 Equality of opportunity
The next subsection formally defines equality of opportunity in order to study whether the nor-
mative criteria usually assumed in the optimal tax literature succeed in reaching it.
3.1 Two equality of opportunity principles
Define, for the case where Y = L or H, the evaluation of the consumption bundle (xY (α) , δY (α))
as
u
¡
xY (α) , δY (α) ,αG
¢
=
½
v (xwY (α))− αG
v (xuY (α, ))
if δY (α) = 1,
if δY (α) = 0,
where labor disutility is evaluated by parameter αG. If αG = α, u
¡
xY (α) , δY (α) ,αG
¢
coincides
with the individual’s own utility.
We assume throughout that people are responsible for their tastes for work α, but not for
their skills3 . We can then apply Fleurbaey (1994) ’s approach and capture the intuitions of equal-
ity of opportunity in two axioms. The first equality of opportunity axiom expresses the idea of
compensation:
EWEP (Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences):
∀α ∈ R+ : u (xL (α) , δL (α) ,α) = u (xH (α) , δH (α) ,α).
An allocation satisfying EWEP is such that diﬀerences in skills do not influence a person’s
welfare. The second axiom of equality of opportunity expresses the idea of responsibility:
3Two remarks can be made at this point. First, if people are not responsible for anything, from a perspective
of equality of opportunity, the only possible objectives are full equality of utility levels or leximin. Second, it is
possible to follow the suggestion by Pestieau and Racionero (2009) to disentangle the parameter α in two components:
α = αP +αD , where people are responsible for αP (a preference parameter), but not for αD (a disability parameter).
The present framework can be adjusted to deal with this issue, without altering the main results of the paper.
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ETES (Equal Transfers for Equal Skills):
∀α,α0 : δL (α) = δL (α0) = 1 and ∀α00 : δL (α00) = 0 :
xwL (α)− wL = xwL (α0)− wL = xuL (α00) = xuL,
∀α,α0 : δH (α) = δH (α0) = 1 and ∀α00 : δH (α00) = 0 :
xwH (α)− wH = xwH (α0)− wH = xuH (α00) = xuH ,
with some abuse of notations for the last term in both expressions. The latter emphasizes that
taxes only depend on skill level. People are hold responsible for their taste for leisure α. For each
skill level all inactive get the same benefit, all workers pay the same tax, and the transfer received
by the inactive is equal to minus the tax paid by the workers. Therefore, welfare diﬀerences that
are caused by diﬀerential tastes are not compensated and fully respected.
We formally define full equality of opportunity as follows:
FEO (Full Equality of Opportunity):
An allocation satisfies full equality of opportunity if it satisfies both EWEP and ETES.
In the traditional framework, where the government only (re-)distributes consumption, even in
the first best there does not exist a FEO allocation -see, e.g., Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995).
For this reason, Fleurbaey (1995b) suggested weakening at least one of the axioms, while maintain-
ing the other4. This allowed him to define two allocations, the first requires the identification of
a reference value for the taste parameter, eα, the second a reference value for the resource bundle,
here taken to be the consumption level ex and δY = 1, y = L or H.
CE (Conditional Equality):
An allocation is the conditional equality allocation if and only if for all α and Y = L or H it
equalizes u (xY (α) , δY (α) , eα) at the highest feasible level.
EE (Egalitarian Equivalence):
An allocation is egalitarian equivalent if and only if for all a,wY and δY (α) : u (xY (α) , δY (α) ,α) =
u (ex, 1,α) and ex is at the highest feasible level.
The CE allocation ensures that all individuals are equally well oﬀ with their actual bundle of
resources when this is evaluated using the reference preference eα. The EE allocation makes all
individuals indiﬀerent between their actual resource bundle and the reference bundle which gives
them ex and where they have to work. In our definition here, we incorporate that no resources are
wasted by, in the CE allocation, equalizing at the highest possible level, and in the EE allocation
pursuing indiﬀerence at the highest feasible level of ex . A CE or EE allocation need not exist. In
particular, in the second best, it will not be possible to equalize the reference utilities as required
by CE, and, even in the first best, indiﬀerence for all individuals with the reference bundle is not
feasible in our model. We formulate maximin social orderings inspired by the CE and EE allocation
at the end of the next subsection.
4Of course, it is also possible to weaken both axioms simultaneously -see, e.g., Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) or
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2009).
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3.2 Diﬀerent social objective functions
The paper will consider the following social objective functions extensively used in the optimal
taxation literature.
The Utilitarian social objective function (used in a.o., Ebert (1992), Diamond and Sheshinski
(1995), Boadway et al. (2000), Hellwig (2007)) is the average of all individual utilities, i.e.
SU = γ
Z ∞
0
δL (α) [v(xwL (α))− α] dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
0
(1− δL (α)) v(xuL (α))dF (α)+
(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
δH (α) [v(xwH (α))− α] dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1− δH (α)) v(xuH (α))dF (α). (2)
Our Welfarist social objective is the average of a concave transformation of individual utilities.
The concave transformation allows the expression of inequality aversion with respect to the distri-
bution of utilities. Let the function Ψ : R → R : a → Ψ (a) be a strictly concave function. Our
Welfarist objective function is
SW = γ
Z ∞
0
δL(α)Ψ (v(xwL (α))− α) dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
0
(1− δL(α))Ψ (v(xuL (α))) dF (α)+
(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
δH(α)Ψ (v(xwH (α))− α) dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1− δH(α))Ψ (v(xuH (α))) dF (α).(3)
Assumed in the seminal article of Mirrlees (1971), this welfare function has been very popular since
then (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond (1998), Choné and Laroque (2005), Kaplow
(2008), Kleven et al. (2009)).
The Boadway et al. (2002)’s objective function allows to attach a weight to individuals’ utilities
that depends on their taste for leisure. Let W (α) : R+ → R+ : α → W (α) be the social welfare
weight given to the utility of an individual with disutility of labor equal to α. The Boadway et al.
objective function is given by
SB = γ
Z ∞
0
δL (α)W (α) [v(xwL (α))− α] dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
0
(1− δL (α))W (α) v(xuL (α))dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
δH (α)W (α) [v(xwH (α))− α] dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1− δH (α))W (α) v(xuH (α))dF (α). (4)
This objective function was explicitly introduced to deal with individuals that are heterogeneous in
skills and preferences. Also used in Cremer et al. (2004 and 2007) for instance, this criterion adopts
distinct cardinalizations of individual utilities depending on the individual’s taste parameter α.
Our Non-Welfarist social objective function uses a paternalistic view for the valuation of labor
disutility. We define the reference labor disutility as α ≥ 0, which is the weight attached by the
government to the α of every individual. The social objective becomes
SNW = γ
·Z ∞
0
δL (α) [v(xwL (α))− α] dF (α)
¸
+ γ
Z ∞
0
(1− δL (α)) v(xuL (α))dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
δH (α) [v(xwH (α))− α] dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
0
(1− δH (α)) v(xuH (α))dF (α). (5)
With this objective function, the social planner has a diﬀerent idea than the individuals themselves
about the ‘correct’ or reasonable disutility of work. There is then a clear paternalistic motive for
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taxation which arises from diﬀerences between social and private preferences. Schokkaert et al.
(2004) consider this social objective function. Marchand et al. (2003) and Pestieau and Racionero
(2009) consider an alternative paternalistic approach in which the government attaches a larger
weight to the labor disutility of disabled individuals. Maximization of non-welfarist social objectives
functions typically select allocations that are not Pareto eﬃcient.
To state the next two objective functions, which are less standard, we define an operator that
takes the first element of a set with two elements if δ (α) equals one, and the second element
otherwise. Formally, we define the operator as
oper
δ(α)
{a, b} = a if δ (α) = 1 and oper
δ(α)
{a, b} = b if δ (α) = 0.
Roemer (1993 and 1998) proposes that equality of opportunity for welfare holds when the
utilities of all those who exercised a comparable degree of responsibility are equal, irrespective
of their skills. Assuming that those that have the same preferences have exercised a comparable
degree of responsibility, the ideal is to give the same utility to those with the same preferences,
irrespective of their skills. Since utilities have to be equal for each preference, it will usually
(except, as we will see in the first best) not be possible to achieve this. Roemer therefore suggests
to maximize a weighted average of the minimal utilities across individuals having the same tastes.
As a result, Fleurbaey (2008) calls this the mean of mins criterion. Roemer’ s (1998) objective
function can be written as
SR =
Z ∞
0
min
(
oper
δL(α)
{v (xwL (α))− α, v (xuL (α))}, oper
δH(α)
{v (xwH (α))− α, v (xuH (α))}
)
dF (α) . (6)
For each α, the government assigns low and high skilled individuals to employment or inactivity.
The min function in the integral term takes, for each α level, the smallest utility across skill types.
The Roemer rule maximizes the sum (over α) of these minimal utility levels. It has been used by
Roemer et al. (2003) to empirically compare the extent to which fiscal policies manage to equalize
opportunities for income acquisition in a set of countries.
While Roemer’s proposal is well known, an obvious alternative was proposed by Van de gaer
(1993). The starting point is that for each level of skill, utility as a function of the taste parameter
can be interpreted as the utilities to which someone with that skill level has access. The proposal is
then to maximize the value of the smallest opportunity set, where the opportunity set is the surface
under utilities to which he as access, weighted by the frequency with which the corresponding
preference parameter occurs. Hence the proposed social objective function, labeled the min of
means criterion by Fleurbaey (2008), is
SV = min
(Z ∞
0
oper
δL(α)
{v (xwL (α))− α, v (xuL (α))}dF (α) ,Z ∞
0
oper
δH(α)
{v (xwH (α))− α, v (xuH (α))}dF (α)
)
. (7)
This criterion and Roemer’s criterion were used to compute optimal linear income taxes in Bossert
et al. (1999) and Schokkaert et al. (2004).5
5Axiomatic characterizations of these criteria can be found in Ooghe et al. (2007) and Fleurbaey (2008).
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We formulate the maximin objective function inspired by the Conditional Equality (CE) allo-
cation:
SCE = min
α,wY
u (xY (α) , δY (α) , eα) , (8)
meaning that the optimal policy is determined such that the lowest level of utility that someone in
the population gets with his actual allocation, evaluated at the reference preferences eα, is as high
as possible. The resulting optimal allocation is not necessarily Pareto eﬃcient. The criterion was
explicitly considered by Bossert et al. (1999).
Finally, we formulate a maximin objective function inspired by the Egalitarian Equivalent (EE)
allocation. For each individual, we determine the consumption level that he needs when he has
to work and is such that he is indiﬀerent to this bundle and his actual consumption bundle.6
Evidently, for workers, this is simply their actual consumption level. Inactive people require a
consumption level equal to v−1 (v (xuY (α)) + α), where x
u
Y (α) is their actual consumption level.
Hence, we can define an EE ordering as maximizing
SEE = min
α,wY
©
xwL (α) , x
w
H (α) , v
−1 (v (xuL (α)) + α) , v
−1 (v (xuH (α)) + α)
ª
. (9)
In our framework, this social ordering is the natural counterpart of the ordering proposed by
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005 and 2006). In their papers, the equivalent wage for an individual is
defined as the wage rate such that he is indiﬀerent between his actual bundle and the bundle that
he could reach if he had his equivalent wage. Their proposed social ordering is then to maximize the
minimal equivalent wage. Fleurbaey and Maniquet work in an intensive labor supply choice model;
the computation of the equivalent wage involves a counterfactual labor supply choice lying between
inactivity and full time employment. In our extensive labor supply model, such a choice is not
available. However, we can adjust the concept by comparing the actual consumption bundle with
the wage making the individual indiﬀerent with full time employment. Formally, in our extensive
margin model, the equivalent wage is defined for the employed as xEY (α) = x
w
Y (α) and for the
inactive as xEu (α) : v
¡
xEu (α)
¢
− α = v (xuY (α)), which implies that xEu (α) = v−1 (v (xuY (α)) + α).
Maximinning this equivalent wage leads to the social ordering defined in (9).
4 First best
This section studies the optimal policies under full information with criteria that are only loosely
based on equality of opportunity principles as well as criteria directly inspired by equality of oppor-
tunity axioms. We state the analytical properties,7 interpret them and check whether the EWEP
and ETES axioms are satisfied. The Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint is
denoted by λ. The superscripts U , W , B, NW , R, V , CE and EE are used to characterize the
variables at the optimum under the Utilitarian, Welfarist, Boadway et al., Non-Welfarist, Roemer,
Van de gaer, Conditional Equality and Egalitarian Equivalent objectives, respectively.
It turns out that the following assignment rule, denoted by AAR, often (but not always) defines
the optimal activity assignment:
6This is similar to the “full-health equivalent income” proposed by Fleurbaey (2005). An alternative egalitarian
equivalent allocation would determine for each individual the consumption level that he needs when he has to be
inactive and that is such that he is indiﬀerent to this bundle and his actual consumption bundle.
7All proofs are given in Appendix A.
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AARX (Activity Assignment Rule under social objective X): there exist αX∗L and α
X∗
H such that
δXL (α) = 1 for all α ≤ αX∗L , δXL (α) = 0 otherwise, δXH (α) = 1 for all α ≤ αX∗H , δXH (α) = 0 otherwise
and αX∗L ≤ αX∗H .
Under this activity assignment rule, those low- (high-) skilled with disutility from work smaller
than αX∗L (α
X∗
H ) are employed, while those with a higher disutility from work are inactive and more
highly than lowly skilled are employed.
Theorem 1a. With full information, the following configuration of policies is optimal:
(a) Utilitarian planner:
Consumption bundles: xU = xwUL (α) = x
uU
L (α) = x
wU
H (α) = x
uU
H (α).
Activity assignment: AARU .
(b) Welfarist planner:
Consumption bundles:
½
xuW = xuWL (α) = x
uW
H (α) = x
wW
L (0) = x
wW
H (0) ,
xwWL (α) = x
wW
H (α) ,
Activity assignment: AARW .
(c) Boadway et al. planner:
Consumption bundles: xB (α) = xwBL (α) = x
uB
L (α) = x
wB
H (α) = x
uB
H (α),
Activity assignment:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Case 1: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) > −1 : AARB.
Case 2: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) = −1 (i.e. W (α)α is constant):
λB =
R∞
0
W (α) v0
¡
xB (α)
¢
dF (α) ,
wHλB > wLλB > W (α)α⇒ nBH = nBL = 1.
wHλB > wLλB =W (α)α⇒ nBH = 1, 0 < nBL < 1
wHλB > W (α)α > wLλB ⇒ nBH = 1, nBL = 0.
wHλB =W (α)α > wLλB ⇒ 0 < nBH < 1, nBL = 0.
W (α)α > wHλB > wLλB ⇒ nBH = nBL = 0,
Case 3: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) < −1 :
δL (α) = 1 for all α ≥ αB∗∗L , δH (α) = 1 for all α ≥ αB∗∗H and αB∗∗L > αB∗∗H .
(d) Non-Welfarist planner:
Consumption bundles: xN = xwNL (α) = x
uN
L (α) = x
wN
H (α) = x
uN
H (α)
Activity assignment:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λN = v0
¡
xN
¢
wHλN > wLλN > α⇒ nNH = nNL = 1.
wHλN > wLλN = α⇒ nNH = 1, 0 < nNL < 1.
wHλN > α > wLλN ⇒ nNH = 1, nNL = 0.
wHλN = α > wLλN ⇒ 0 < nNH < 1, nNL = 0.
α > wHλN > wLλN ⇒ nNH = nNL = 0.
(e) Roemer planner:
Consumption bundles:
½
∀α ∈ [0,α∗RL ) ∪ [α∗RH ,∞) : xwRL (α) = xwRH (α) = xuRL (α) = xuRH (α) = xR,
∀α ∈ [α∗RL ,α∗RH ) : xuRL (α) = v−1
¡
v
¡
xwRH (α)
¢
− α
¢
< xR.
Activity assignment: AARR.
(f) Van de gaer planner:
Consumption bundles: xwVL (α) = x
uV
L (α) = x
V < xwVH (α) = x
uV
H (α) = x
V
.
Activity assignment: AARV .
(a) Utilitarian planner
A Utilitarian planner gives the same consumption xU to everyone, irrespective of his skill level and
his taste parameter. Workers are clearly worse oﬀ than inactive people; the worst oﬀ will be the
high-skilled workers with taste parameter α∗H .
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(b) Welfarist planner
The main diﬀerence between a Welfarist and a Utilitarian planner is that a Welfarist plan-
ner will give diﬀerent consumption bundles to workers, depending on their disutility of labor.
More precisely, it can be shown that ∂xwWY (α) /∂α > 0 with Y = L,H
8. A Welfarist plan-
ner tries to compensate workers with a higher disutility of labor by giving them additional con-
sumption, but the compensation is insuﬃcient to make utility independent of labor disutility:
∂
¡
v
¡
xwWy (α)
¢
− α
¢
/∂α < 0. As a result, the high-skilled worker with taste α∗H remains the worst
oﬀ, as under the Utilitarian criterion. Moreover, consumption of workers is equalized at each α
level, i.e. xwWL (α) = x
wW
H (α).
(c) Boadway et al. planner
The Boadway et al. planner’s consumption function depends on tastes only. If the weight given
to individuals with a higher disutility of labor α increases (decreases), those with a higher (lower)
α get more consumption, i.e. ∂xB (α) /∂α ≥ (≤) 0 if W 0 (.) ≥ (≤) 0. Activity assignment can
take many forms, depending on the elasticity of the social welfare function with respect to the
taste parameter, (∂W (α) /∂α) (α/W (α)). If this elasticity is larger than −1 (as in the Utilitarian
case where W (α) is a constant and so the elasticity is zero), the usual assignment to activities,
AAR, occurs as in the Utilitarian and Welfarist cases. However, if this elasticity is smaller than
−1 (which requires that W (α) is suﬃciently declining in α), the Boadway et al. planner wants to
keep those with a high disutility of labor in work. If the elasticity is exactly −1, corner solutions
prevail in which at least everyone in one skill group works or is inactive. If there exists a group for
which no corner solution occurs, the planner is indiﬀerent to who (i.e. which value for the taste
parameter) is assigned to work. Which case occurs if W (α)α is constant depends crucially on the
level of this constant.
(d) Non-Welfarist planner
The Non-Welfarist consumption function has the same features as the Utilitarian one: everyone
receives the same consumption, xN , irrespective of his skill and his taste parameter. The activity
assignment crucially depends on the level of α. Moreover, the Non-Welfarist and Boadway et al.
criterion, with elasticity of W (α) equal to −1, both lead to similar activity assignment, with the
reference α playing the role of the constant W (α)α.
(e) Roemer planner
Roemer planner’s consumption function depends on tastes only. The Roemer planner satisfies
AAR. However, wH-workers and wL-inactive having the same α ∈ [α∗RL ,α∗RH ) receive the same
utility level since xuRL (α) = v
−1 ¡v ¡xwRH (α)¢− α¢ ∀α ∈ [α∗RL ,α∗RH ).
(f) Van de gaer planner
The main diﬀerence between Roemer and Van de gaer planners is that the latter gives diﬀerent
consumption bundles to people with identical α and the same activity choice, when their skills
diﬀer. In particular, high-skilled people receive a larger consumption level than low-skilled people,
x
V ≥ xV .
Among all allocations listed in theorem 1a, only the one derived under Roemer criterion
satisfies EWEP. With all criteria, there exist values for α for which high-skilled, contrary to
low-skilled, have to work. By definition, EWEP then requires v (xwL (α)) − α = v (xuL (α)) ⇔
8For this and the other formal properties of stated in this discussion, see appendix A.
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xuL (α) = v
−1 (v (xwH(α))− α) ∀α ∈ [α∗RL ,α∗RH ). This equality never occurs except under Roemer’s
criterion. Since, in addition, Roemer’s allocation is also such that ∀α ∈ [0,α∗RL ) (∀α ∈ [α∗RH ,∞)),
everyone works (is inactive) and receives the same consumption, Roemer’s allocation satisfies
EWEP.
For all above optimal allocations ∃α,α0 ∈ R+ : xwY (α) = xuY (α0) for Y = L or H. Since wY > 0,
this violates ETES.
We next turn to the FEO, CE and EE criteria described in the previous section. These criteria
are directly inspired by the equality of opportunity axioms.
Theorem 1b. With full information, the following configuration of policies is optimal:
(a) FEO:
(i) nH = nL = 1 and xwL = x
w
H = γwL + (1− γ)wH −R.
(ii) nH = nL = 0 and xu = −R.
(b) CE: There are five types of optimal allocations possible:
(i) nH = nL = 1 and xwL = x
w
H = γwL + (1− γ)wH −R.
(ii) nH = 1, 0 < nL < 1,−xu = [wL − xwL ] and xwL = xwH = v−1 (v (xu)− eα).
(iii) nH = 1, nL = 0 and xu = [(1− γ) (wH − xwH)−R] /γ and xwH = v−1 (v (xu)− eα).
(iv) 0 < nH < 1, nL = 0,−xu = [wH − xwH ] and xwH = v−1 (v (xu)− eα).
(v) nH = nL = 0 and xu = −R.
(c) EE:
xwL = x
w
H = γwL + (1− γ)wH −R and xu = 0,
α∗L = α
∗
H = v (γwL + (1− γ)wH)− v (0) .
(a) FEO allocation
By construction, the FEO allocations satisfy both EWEP and ETES, however they are quite
trivial. FEO (i) assigns everyone to work while FEO (ii) implies that everyone is inactive. FEO
(i) and (ii) give everyone the same consumption. Note that, contrary to FEO (i), FEO (ii) gives
everyone the same utility. It is easy to verify that neither of the FEO allocations is Pareto eﬃcient.
(b) CE allocation
With the CE criterion, the two FEO allocations can be optimal as well as three others. The
latter are denoted by CE (ii), (iii) and (iv). The CE allocation equalizes u (xY (α) , δY (α) , eα) for
all α and Y = L,H. Therefore, welfares are equalized when bundles are evaluated with references
preferences, but not with actual preferences (see, (ii), (iii), (iv)). EWEP is thus not satisfied. We
will now check the validity of ETES. In the CE allocation (ii), all high-skilled work and a fraction of
the low-skilled agents work. All high-skilled people receive the same consumption bundle xwH and
all low-skilled people receive the same transfer −xu = wL − xwL . This CE allocation thus satisfies
ETES. CE allocation (iii) has all high-skilled and no low-skilled working. ETES is then satisfied.
The CE allocation (iv) has only a fraction of the high-skilled working. Again the planner does not
care which high-skilled. Since no low-skilled work, and for the high-skilled −xu = [wH − xwH ], this
allocation too satisfies ETES.
Which of these CE allocations is the optimal one depends on the parameters of the model. Foreα suﬃciently low, the optimum will be of type (i). As eα increases, we move over cases (ii), (iii) and
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(iv) to (v). The properties of the CE allocation clearly show that it is possible to find allocations
that have attractive properties from the perspective of equality of opportunity in the first best.
Moreover, note the qualitative similarity of activity assignment with the CE objective in theo-
rem 1b, the Boadway et al. objective in case 2 of theorem 1a and the Non-Welfarist objective in
theorem 1a. The crucial diﬀerence between these allocations in theorem 1a and the CE allocation
is the determination of the consumption bundles: the Welfarist planner gives the same consump-
tion to everyone, the Boadway et al. planner in case 2 gives lower consumption to the individuals
with less deserving tastes (i.e. with a higher α), while the CE planner determines the consumption
bundles such that they satisfy the ETES axiom.
(c) EE allocation
Under the EE allocation, all workers receive the same consumption bundle, irrespective of their
skill level. The inactive get zero benefits. This looks harsh at first sight, but in terms of equivalent
wages, the metric used by the planner in this case, these individuals are best oﬀ, and, in the present
framework people are responsible for their preference. Observe that this policy satisfies EWEP.
All high-skilled pay the same tax, all low-skilled pay the same tax, and all inactive get the same
zero transfer. The tax paid is not equal to minus the transfer received, however. Hence ETES is
not satisfied.
The EE allocation assigns the same consumption bundle to workers as allocations FEO (i) and
CE (i), but contrary to these allocations, those with high disutility of labor are not working. They
are inactive, and are, actually better oﬀ (both in terms of utility and equivalent wages) than under
allocations FEO (i) and CE (i).
We summarize the performance of the criteria in theorem 1a-b from the equality of opportunity
principles in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: equality of opportunity axioms and social objectives in the first best.
Social Objective Satisfies EWEP? Satisfies ETES?
Utilitarian
Welfarist
Boadway et al.
Non-Welfarist
Van de gaer
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
No No
Roemer Yes No
FEO Yes Yes
Egalitarian Equivalent Yes No
Conditional Egalitarian No Yes
Given the origin of these social orderings, it is unsurprising to see that those criteria which
originate from the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much better than
the traditional criteria. They were designed to do so. It is of course possible to search for the
first best optimal allocation over the set of allocations satisfying one of the equality of opportunity
principles, using the objective functions that do not satisfy the equality of opportunity principle
under consideration. However, to keep the size of the paper within reasonable limits and since the
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second best context is more relevant, we only illustrate this procedure in the second best context
9.
Finally, all the first best solutions listed in Theorem 1a and 1b depend on both α and wi.
Therefore, they are not implementable when the government only observes income (second best).
The next section deals with this issue.
5 Second best optima
5.1 Second best constraints and their implications
In second best, the Government needs to take into account the set of self-selection or incentive
compatibility constraints (hereafter ICC) in order to prevent individuals from a given type from
mimicking (i.e. taking the tax-treatment designed for) individuals of other types. We first state
these IC constraints and then discuss their implications for the social objective functions.
Agents of wL-type choose between v(xu) and v(xL) − α. Introducing the threshold value a∗L,
and dropping the superscripts U , W , B, NW , R, V , CE and EE for notational simplicity, the
ICC10 on wL-agents can be written as:
v(xL)− α∗L = v(xu), (10)
such that a low skilled with taste parameter α chooses low skilled employment instead of inactivity
if and only if α < α∗L.
Agents of wH-type choose between v(xu), v(xL) − α and v(xH) − α. Since all our objective
functions are increasing in individuals’ consumption, it will, just like in the first best, never be op-
timal that high-skilled people work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-skilled jobs
instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase everyone’s consump-
tion in a way that respects the ICC and hence increases the social objective’s value. Consequently,
to induce high-skilled people to work in high-skilled jobs,
xH ≥ xL, (11)
and, introducing the threshold value α∗H , the ICC on agents of wH-type states
v(xH)− α∗H = v(xu), (12)
such that a high skilled agent with taste parameter α prefers high-skilled employment to inactivity
if and only if α < α∗H . Moreover, from (10), (11) and (12), we have that
α∗H ≥ α∗L. (13)
As a result of the second best constraints (10), (12) and (13), irrespective of the social objective
function, activity assignment has to be of type AARX . Moreover, because of (11), utility of wH-
workers is at least as high as of wL-workers. Hence, the utilities as a function of α, for wL- and
wH-skilled agents, look as in the following Figure.
9We only impose one principle at a time, as imposing both principles simultaneously leads to the FEO allocation.
10The set of IC constraints for each agent of type (wY ,α) (with Y := L,H and α ∈ R+) can be rewritten
as constraints (10)-(12). Moreover, since the labor supply decision is restricted to be binary, the (direct truthful)
mechanism that implements the optimal allocations is not fully revealing. Each agent fully reveals his wY information
but not his α value; he announces only whether α is larger or lower than α∗Y .
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Figure 1: utilities in the second best.
The full line is the utility of a wH-individual. He works if his disutility of work α ≤ α∗H ,
and he is inactive otherwise. Similarly the bold dotted line is the utility of a wL-individual. The
latter works for α ≤ α∗L and is inactive otherwise. Diﬀerent planners choose diﬀerent values for
(xu, xL, xH ,α∗L,α
∗
H), but the qualitative shape of the utilities as a function of α, for high- and
low-skilled individuals, is always as indicated in the graph.
The second best framework has important implications for the equality of opportunity princi-
ples, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Equality of opportunity principles in the second best.
(a) A necessary and suﬃcient condition to fully satisfy EWEP is that α∗L = α
∗
H , which requires
that xL = xH .
(b) A necessary and suﬃcient condition to fully satisfy ETES is that xL − wL = xu = xH − wH .
Part (a) says that the threshold values α∗L and α
∗
H have to be the same. To accomplish this,
the government has to oﬀer the same consumption level to high and low-skilled workers. It implies
that the same number of high and low-skilled individuals will work. Part (b) of the corollary
follows immediately from application of the ETES axiom and has two noteworthy implications.
First, since xL − wL = xu and xH − wH = xu, the government cannot subsidize or tax the
participation decision. Since it cannot do this at the bottom end of the skill distribution, there is
neither a negative income tax nor an earned income tax credit. Second, since xL−wL = xH −wH ,
the government cannot redistribute between low and high-skilled workers. This is a very severe
restriction, which makes the ETES axiom diﬃcult to defend in the second best context.
As a result of the second best constraints, the second best optimal tax problem in its general
form reduces to the following maximization problem.
GSBP (General Second Best Problem):
max
xL,xH ,xu,α∗L,α
∗
H
SX (xL, xH , x
u,α∗L,α
∗
H) ,
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subject to the government budget constraint,
γ [(wL − xL)F (α∗L)− xu (1− F (α∗L))]
+ (1− γ) [(wH − xH)F (α∗H)− xu (1− F (α∗H))]−R = 0,
and constraints (10), (11) and (12).
The second best framework has important consequences for the specification of the social ob-
jective functions. Combining the expressions for the social objective functions (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (9) with expression (10), (11), (12) and (13) results in the following writing of the
objective functions, as shown in Appendix B. Again, we skip the superscripts U , W , B, NW , R,
V , CE and EE for notation simplicity.
(a) Utilitarian
eSU = γ Z α∗L
0
[v(xL)− α] dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
α∗L
v(xu)dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z α∗H
0
[v(xH)− α] dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
α∗H
v(xu)dF (α).
(b) Welfarist
eSW = γ Z α∗L
0
Ψ (v(xL)− α) dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
α∗L
Ψ (v(xu)) dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z α∗H
0
Ψ (v(xH)− α) dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
α∗H
Ψ (v(xu)) dF (α).
(c) Boadway et al.
eSB = γ Z α∗L
0
W (α) [v(xL)− α] dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
α∗L
W (α) v(xu)dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z α∗H
0
W (α) [v(xH)− α] dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
α∗H
W (α) v(xu)dF (α).
(d) Non-Welfarist
eSNW = γ "Z α∗L
0
[v(xL)− α] dF (α)
#
+ γ
Z ∞
α∗L
v(xu)dF (α)
+(1− γ)
Z α∗H
0
[v(xH)− α] dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
α∗H
v(xu)dF (α).
(e) Roemer and (f) Van de gaer
eSR = Z α∗L
0
(v (xL)− α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
v (xu) dF (α) .
(g) Conditional Equality eSCE = v (xL)− eα subject to eα ≥ α∗L.
(h) Egalitarian Equivalent eSEE = xL.
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Under asymmetric information, Roemer and Van de gaer’s criterion are equal. Due to the
second best constraint, utility as a function of the taste parameter of the low-skilled will never be
below utility as a function of the taste parameter for the high-skilled. One implication of this is
that the opportunity set for the lowly skilled is below the one for the highly skilled, hence, in the
second best the mean of mins and min of means criterion will yield the same solution.
5.2 Optimal tax formula
Before we can characterize the optimal tax rates, we need to introduce more definitions. Let
TL = wL − xL, TH = wH − xH , and Tu = −xu, be the tax paid by the low-skilled workers, the
high-skilled workers and the inactive, respectively. Define the elasticities of participation of the
low-skilled with respect to xL11 and of the high-skilled with respect to xH as
η (xL,α∗L) =
xL
F (α∗L)
f (α∗L) v
0 (xL) , (14)
η (xH ,α∗H) =
xH
F (α∗H)
f (α∗H) v
0 (xH) , (15)
respectively. Next, observe that the average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of con-
sumption, is given by
gXP
def≡ γF (α
X∗
L )
v0(xXL )
+
γ(1− F (αX∗L )) + (1− γ)(1− F (αX∗H ))
v0(xuX)
+
(1− γ)F (αX∗H )
v0(xXH)
. (16)
Let subscripts to the function S denote the partial derivative of S with respect to the argument
in the subscript and note that the eﬀect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social
objective function is given by
DX =
SXxL
v0(xL)
+
SXxH
v0(xH)
+
SXxu
v0 (xu)
. (17)
Finally, the average social marginal utility of consumption for workers of skill level Y (Y = L or
H) is
gXL =
SXxL
λγF (α∗L)
and gXH =
SXxH
λ (1− γ)F (α∗H)
.
The following theorem states the solution for the general second best problem.
Theorem 2: Under asymmetric Information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
(TL − Tu)
xL
=
1
η (xL,α∗L)
·
1− gXL +
ν
λγF (α∗L)
¸
−
SXα∗L
λγf (α∗L)xL
.
(TH − Tu)
xH
=
1
η (xH ,α∗H)
·
1− gXH −
ν
λ (1− γ)F (α∗H)
¸
−
SXα∗H
λ (1− γ) f (α∗H)xH³
λX
´−1
= gXP /D
X ,
where ν is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint xH ≥ xL.
11η
¡
xL,α∗L
¢ def≡ ¡xL/γF ¡α∗L¢¢ ¡∂ ¡γF ¡α∗L¢¢ /∂xL¢. Since α∗L = v (xL)−v (xu), we get ∂α∗L/∂xL = v0 (xL) hence
we obtain (14).
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The λ−1 equations are similar to Diamond and Sheshinsky (1995)’s equation (6), p.6. and are
associated with an equal marginal change of the consumption of everyone in the economy. Consider
a uniform increase in all private utilities of one unit. This does not change the activity decisions.
To accomplish this uniform increase, we need per low-skilled worker 1/v0 (xL) extra units of con-
sumption, per high-skilled worker we need 1/v0 (xH) extra units of consumption and per inactive
person we need 1/v0 (xu) extra units of consumption. Weighting this by the frequencies of these
groups in the population, we find that we need an additional gP (xu, xL, xH ,α∗L,α
∗
H) units of public
means to finance this operation. In terms of social welfare, this is worth λgP (xu, xL, xH ,α∗L,α
∗
H).
This has to be equal to the increase in the social objective function caused by the uniform increase
in utilities, which is equal to D. The equation for λ−1 thus equates the inverse of the marginal
cost of public funds to the ratio between the average of the inverse of the private utilities and the
marginal social utility of a uniform increase in all individual utilities.
Next, we give a simple heuristic interpretation of the optimal tax formulas in the spirit of Saez
(2002). Consider a small increase of the consumption xL (i.e. a small reduction of the income tax
in low-skilled jobs), around the optimal tax schedule. This has a mechanical eﬀect and a behavioral
(or labor supply response) eﬀect.
Mechanical eﬀect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to −γF (α∗L)dxL because low-skilled workers
have dxL additional consumption. Each unit of xL is worth
¡
SXxL − v
¢
/λ in terms of government
revenue. Hence the total value of the decrease in tax revenue is worth −
¡
γF (α∗L)−
¡
SXxL − v
¢
/λ
¢
dxL
in terms of government revenue, which can be written as
−
·
1− S
X
xL − v
λγF (α∗L)
¸
γF (α∗L)dxL.
Behavioral eﬀect
The change dxL > 0 induces a change in α∗L equal to (∂α
∗
L/∂xL) dxL. By (10), ∂α
∗
L/∂xL = v
0 (xL)
and from the definition of the elasticity of participation (14), v0 (xL) = [F (α∗L) η (xL,α
∗
L)] / [xLf (α
∗
L)],
such that the induced change in α∗L is [F (α
∗
L) η (xL,α
∗
L)] / [xLf (α
∗
L)] dxL. A change in the critical
value α∗L has a welfare eﬀect, worth S
X
α∗L
/λ in terms of government revenue and increases gov-
ernment revenue by γ [TL − Tu] f (α∗L). Hence the total behavioral eﬀect in terms of government
revenue equals "
SXα∗L
λ
+ γ (TL − Tu) f (α∗L)
#
F (α∗L) η (xL,α
∗
L)
xLf (α∗L)
dxL
At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects has to be nil. It is easy to
verify that this yields the first equation in theorem 2. The second equation can be given a similar
interpretation.
Observe that the optimal tax formula in the theorem contain three elements: the deviation of
the average social marginal utility of consumption for workers of a particular skill level from unity,
1 − gXY , the Lagrangian multiplier ν and the term SXα∗Y (Y = L or H). The last two terms have
not been dealt with in the literature on optimal taxation with extensive labor supply, as they do
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not appear with the social objective functions U and W that have been considered so far. This is
stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2: the value of SXα∗Y (Y = L,H):
(a) SXα∗Y = 0 for X = U , W , B, R, EE, CE.
(b) SNWα∗L = [α
∗
L − α] γf (α∗L) and SNWα∗H = [α
∗
H − α] (1− γ) f (α∗H).
Lemma 3: the value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
(a) ν = 0 for X = U , W , B, and NW .
(b) ν ≥ 0 for X = R, EE and CE.
Lemma 2 follows from partially diﬀerentiating the expressions for the social objective functions
with respect to α∗Y (Y = L,H). These terms represent direct eﬀects of changes in the critical
values on the social objective functions and occur only in the Non-Welfarist case. Lemma 3 is
slightly less straightforward. Remember that ν is equal to the sum of the welfare and budget eﬀect
of decreasing xH and, at the same time it is equal to the sum of the welfare and budget eﬀect
of increasing xL. Hence these two eﬀects have to be equal. Moreover, if ν > 0, the sum of the
welfare eﬀects of decreasing xH and increasing xL and their government revenue eﬀect have to be
equal. If, evaluated at xH = xL and α∗H = α
∗
L, the per capita welfare eﬀects
³
SXxL + S
X
α∗L
´
/γ and³
SXxH + S
X
α∗H
´
/ (1− γ) are equal (as is the case for X = U , W , B and NW ), then the per capita
budget eﬀect of decreasing xH must be equal to the per capita budget eﬀect of increasing xL for
xH = xL and α∗H = α
∗
L. These per capita budget eﬀects are F (x
∗
Y )−(wY − xY + xu) f (α∗Y ) v0 (xY )
for Y = L or H. However, with xH = xL and α∗H = α
∗
L these cannot be equal, as wH > wL. The
objective functions R, EE and CE have unequal per capita welfare eﬀects, so an optimum with
ν > 0 does not require equal per capita budget eﬀects; it is possible to obtain an optimum where
ν > 0.
Lemma 3 combined with lemma 1 has implications for the performance of the diﬀerent social
objective functions from the perspective of the equality of opportunity principles. Since the U , W ,
B, and NW criteria have a zero value for ν, their solution will have xH > xL (as shown in lemma
C of Appendix C), and so α∗H > α
∗
L, such that their solution violates EWEP. However, with the
R, EE and CE criteria, ν may be strictly positive, in which case xH = xL and α∗H = α
∗
L such that
EWEP is satisfied.
In order to obtain optimal tax rates with the diﬀerent social objective functions, we use the
relevant properties of these social objective functions and plug them in the equations of the theorem.
Lemma 2 gives us the values for SXα∗Y (Y = L,H), and lemma 3 the values for the Lagrangian
multipliers. The average social marginal utility of consumption gXY under objective functions X
(= U,W,B,NW,R, V,CE or EE) for agents of skill level Y (=L or H) are given in the following
table.
Using these expression in the equations of theorem 2, together with ν = 0 for X = U , W , B
and NW results in the following corollary.12
12The optimal activity assignments are characterized by α∗H > α
∗
L > 0 under the U, W , B and NW criteria, while
α∗H ≥ α∗L under the R, EE and CE criteria. Moreover, α∗H <∞ for all criteria. Appendix C states the proofs.
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X gXL g
X
H
U,NW
v0(xXL )
λX
v0(xXH)
λX
W
v0(xWL )
λW
R αW∗L
0 Ψ0(v(xWL )−α)dF (α)
F (αW∗L )
v0(xWH )
λW
R αW∗H
0 Ψ0(v(xWH )−α)dF (α)
F (αW∗H )
B
v0(xBL)
λB
R αB∗L
0 W (α)dF (α)
F (αB∗L )
v0(xBH)
λB
R αB∗H
0 W (α)dF (α)
F (αB∗H )
R(= V )
v0(xRL)
λRγ 0
EE 1λEEγF (αEE∗L )
0
CE
v0(xCEL )
λCEγF (αCE∗L )
0
Corollary 2. Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
X
³
λX
´−1
TXH −TXu
xXH
TXL −TXu
xXL
U gUP
W gWP /D
W 1
η(xXH ,αX∗H )
¡
1− gXH
¢
1
η(xXL ,αX∗L )
¡
1− gXL
¢
B gBP /D
B
R = V gRP
EE gEEP /D
EE 1
η(xXH ,αX∗H )
µ
1− νX
λX(1−γ)F(αX∗H )
¶
1
η(xXL ,αX∗L )
µ
1− gXL + ν
X
λXγF(αX∗L )
¶
CE gCEP
1
η(xCEL ,αCE∗L )
µ
1− (1− ξ) gCEL + ν
CE
λCEγF(αCE∗L )
¶
NW gNWP
1
η(xNWH ,αNW∗H )
¡
1− gNWH
¢
− α
NW∗
H −α
λNWxNWL
1
η(xNWL ,αNW∗L )
¡
1− gNWL
¢
− α
NW∗
L −α
λNWxNWL
with
DW = γ
"Z αW∗L
0
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xWL
¢
− α
¢
dF (α) +
Z ∞
αW∗L
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xuW
¢¢
dF (α)
#
+(1− γ)
"Z αW∗H
0
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xWH
¢
− α
¢
dF (α) +
Z ∞
αW∗H
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xuW
¢¢
dF (α)
#
,
DB =
Z ∞
0
W (α) dF (α) and DEE = 1/v0
¡
xEEL
¢
.
Taking as a benchmark case the formula for the popular objective functions U and W , we see
three sources of adjustment. Let us focus on the formula for the lowly skilled. First, with the
Non-Welfarist criterion, the extra term [αL − α] / [λxL] appears. It captures the social value of the
divergence between private and social preferences. Second in the Conditional Equality planner’s
optimal policy, the multiplier associated with the constraint eα ≥ α∗L enters in ¡TCEL − TCEu ¢ /xCEL .
If the constraint is binding, the planner needs to bring α∗L down, for which it has to decrease x
CE
L
or increase xCEu. The former increases TCEL , the latter decreases T
CE
u , and so
¡
TCEL − TCEu
¢
/xCEL
must increase. This explains why an increase in ξ increases the right hand side of the equation in the
table for
¡
TCEL − TCEu
¢
/xCEL . Third, with the social policies inspired by equality of opportunity
principles (X = R, CE or EE), it is possible that the constraint xH ≥ xL is binding and ν > 0
hence this term enters the optimal tax formula. In this case, the planner would like to decrease
xL, which requires an increase in TL, such that the multiplier enters positively in the right hand
side of the equation in the table for
¡
TXL − TXu
¢
/xXL .
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Since Diamond (1980), it is well known that subsidizing the low-skilled workers more than
inactive people (i.e. TL < Tu) can be optimal when the labor supply is modeled along the extensive
margin. Using the definition of Saez (2002), an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is then optimal.
On the contrary, when TL > Tu a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. Alternatively, since
TL < (>)Tu can be rewritten as wL < (>)xL − xu, i.e. the income gain when a low-skilled agent
enters the labor force (xL−xu) is larger (lower) than the gross labor income (wL). In other words,
the labor supply of the low-skilled is distorted upwards (downwards), compared to laissez faire.
Theorem 2 can be used to study the necessary conditions for an EITC or a NIT under other criteria
than the standard Utilitarian and Welfarist ones. Corollary 3 emphasizes that the Roemer, EE,
CE and Non-Welfarist criteria challenge the standard necessary conditions.
Corollary 3. Optimality of EITC or NIT in second best.
Social Objective ETES/ NIT/ EITC?
Utilitarian
Welfarist
Boadway et al.
⎫
⎬
⎭ NIT (EITC) if g
X
L < (>) 1
Roemer (=V)
Egalitarian Equivalent
¾
NIT (EITC) if gXL − ν
X
λγF(αX∗L )
< (>) 1
Conditional Egalitarian NIT (EITC) if (1− ξ) gCEL − ν
CE
λCEγF(αCE∗L )
< (>) 1
Non-Welfarist NIT (EITC) if 1
η(xNWL ,αNW∗L )
¡
1− gNWL
¢
> (<)
αNW∗L −α
λNWxNWL
Maximin NIT
Under the Utilitarian, the Welfarist and the Boadway et al. objectives, we retrieve the result
that the average social weight of the low-skilled workers larger than one is a necessary condition
for the EITC to be optimal. For the Roemer, Egalitarian Equivalent and Conditional Egalitarian
objective functions, this condition has to be adjusted since the constraint that xH ≥ xL may be
binding. If this constraint is binding, a NIT can be optimal even when gXL is larger than one. In
that sense, these social objective functions that find their inspiration in equality of opportunity
theories are more in favor of a NIT.
The necessary condition to obtain unambiguous results under the Non-Welfarist criterion is
clearly more complicated: there is no simple relationship between the average social weight of the
low-skilled workers being larger than one and the optimality of an EITC. The EITC (NIT) encour-
ages (discourages) participation of the marginal worker, which results in an increased (decreased)
utility of consumption equal to αN∗L , which is desirable if this is larger (smaller) than α, the utility
cost of work in the eyes of the Non-Welfarist planner. The extra term
¡
αN∗L − α
¢
/
³
λNxNL
´
which
appears at the right hand side in corollary 3 is used as a device to correct undesirable social out-
comes. It corrects individual labor supply to correspond to social preferences13. Hence, if social
preferences are characterized by αN∗L > (<)α, the government encourages (discourages) participa-
tion, the right hand side of the inequality in the corollary is positive, such that the EITC (NIT)
13Put diﬀerently, the other planners (including the Conditional Egalitarian when the constraint eα > αC∗L is not
binding) all respect individual’s preferences, and so they evaluate the marginal individual’s disutility at α∗L, such
that this term drops out.
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then becomes more attractive for the Non-Welfarist planner. This term is sometimes called the
paternalistic or first best motive for taxation since it arises from diﬀerences between social and pri-
vate preferences (Kanbur et al., 2006). Assuming αN∗L > α, when the Non-Welfarist government’s
views on working becomes more “Calvinistic”, i.e. when α decreases, the term at the right hand
side becomes larger and hence plays in favor of an EITC to promote participation of more people.
As a final point of reference, we compare our policy prescriptions with the policy prescription of
the Maximin social objective function. Maximin, which is a subcase of the Welfarist criterion plays
in favor of a NIT, as shown in Choné and Laroque (2005). Under Maximin, only the least-well oﬀ
receive a positive average social marginal utility of consumption. Due to the IC constraints, the
least-well oﬀ are the inactive hence gWL = g
W
H = 0, and it can be shown that ν = 0.
14 Substituting
the latter into the optimal Welfarist tax formulas of theorem 2 yields¡
TML − TMu
¢
/xML =
¡
1/η
¡
xML ,α
U∗
L
¢¢
and
¡
TMH − TMu
¢
/xMH =
¡
1/η
¡
xMH ,α
U∗
H
¢¢
where M has been used as superscript for Maximin. Therefore TML − TMu > 0 hence a NIT is
always optimal under Maximin.
Empirical studies suggest that participation decisions are more elastic at the bottom of the
skill distribution (see the empirical evidence surveyed by Immervoll et al., 2007, and Meghir and
Phillips, 2008) which motivates the following assumption:
Assumption 1: η (xL,α∗L) ≥ η (xH ,α∗H).
Corollary 4. Under assumption 1, for the Utilitarian, Welfarist and Boadway et al. when W (α)
is a decreasing function and for the Roemer, EE, CE (when ξ < 1):15
(TL − Tu) /xL < (TH − Tu) /xH
Our model is an extensive model of labor supply. We have that the degree to which labor
supply is distorted downwards depends on the diﬀerence between taxes paid when working and
taxes paid when inactive (the latter is −xu). The larger is this diﬀerence, the more labor supply
is distorted downwards; if the diﬀerence is negative, labor supply is distorted upwards. We now
have the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Under assumption 1, the Utilitarian, Welfarist, and Boadway et al. criteria when
W (α) is a decreasing function and the Roemer, EE and CE (when ξ < 1) criteria, the labor supply
of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply of the low-skilled.
The statement that labor supply of the high-skilled is more downwardly distorted, also allows for
the possibility that it is less upwardly distorted than the labor supply of the low-skilled. Which one
of these possibilities happens, depends crucially on the amount of external resources the economy
has at its disposal.
14This follows from lemma B given in the proof of lemma 3 in the appendix, as for Maximin SMα∗
L
= SMα∗
H
= SMxL =
SMxH = 0.
15For the Roemer, EE and CE criteria when ν > 0 we have η
¡
xL,α∗L
¢
= η
¡
xH ,α∗H
¢
= η (x,α∗).
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5.3 Restricted second best
Lemma 1 lists the requirement of the equality of opportunity principles in the second best. In this
section, we search for the optimal policies when these policies are restricted such that they satisfy
at least one of the principles fully. Appendix D gives all proofs of this section.
In the discussion following lemma 1, we already noted the restrictive nature of ETES. The
severity of the ETES axiom in the context of our model also appears clearly in the following
theorem, which shows that, in the second best, there is only one possible allocation that satisfies
ETES.
Theorem 3. Second best optima satisfying ETES.
There exists only one second best allocation satisfying ETES. The corresponding values for
(xu,α∗L,α
∗
H) are determined by xL = wL + x
u, xH = wH + xu and
xu [1− 2 [γF (α∗L) + (1− γ)F (α∗H)]] = R,
α∗L = v (wL + x
u)− v (xu) ,
α∗H = v (wH + x
u)− v (xu) .
Due to the severe implications of the ETES axiom in our model, we think that, in the second
best model, priority should be given to the EWEP principle. We now show which allocations are
second best optimal under the diﬀerent criteria, when the optimum is sought under the allocations
satisfying EWEP. Of course, when the optimal policies under the equality of opportunity inspired
social objective functions automatically satisfy EWEP (i.e. when ν > 0), the optima derived in
this section for X = R, EE and CE will be identical to the optima in the previous subsection.
From lemma 1, (a) we know that the critical values and the consumption levels for both types
of workers have to be the same. We denote this critical value by α∗ and the workers’ consumption
by xw:
v (xw)− α∗ = v (xu) . (18)
The only policy instruments of the planners are now xw and xu which prevents any redistri-
bution between wL and wH-workers. Hence, the following programming problem describes the
EWEP- restricted general second best problem:
ERGSBP (EWEP Restricted General Second Best Problem):
max
xx,xu,α∗
SX (xw, xu,α∗) ,
subject to the government budget constraint,
[γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw]F (α∗)− xu (1− F (α∗))−R = 0,
and constraint (18).
We define the following elasticity of participation (which is any of the previous elasticities where
xL = xH = xw is substituted):
η (xw,α∗) =
xw
F (α∗)
f (α∗) v0 (xw) . (19)
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The average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of consumption is now given by
gXP
def≡ F (α
X∗)
v0(xwX)
+
(1− F (αX∗))
v0(xuX)
, (20)
the eﬀect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social objective function equals
DX =
SXxu
v0 (xu)
+
SXxw
v0 (xw)
, (21)
and the average social marginal utility of workers’ consumption is
gX =
SXxw
λF (α∗)
.
The following theorem states the solution for the EWEP restricted General Second Best Prob-
lem.
Theorem 4: Under asymmetric Information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraint (18), and the following equations:
γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw + xu)
xw
=
1
η (xw,α∗)
£
1− gX
¤
− S
X
α∗
λf (α∗)xw
.
λ−1 = gXP /D
X .
The interpretation of the equation for λ−1 is similar to the interpretation in the previous section.
To obtain more specific expressions for the diﬀerent social objective functions, observe that SXα∗ = 0
for all objective functions, except for the Non-Welfarist, for which SXα∗ = (α∗ − α) f (α∗). The
average social marginal utility of consumption gX under objective function X (= U , W , B, N , R,
CE or EE) is given in the following table:
X gX
U,NW
v0(xXL )
λX
W
v0(xwW )
λW
R αW∗
0
Ψ0(v(xwW )−α)dF (α)
F (αW∗)
B
v0(xwB)
λB
R αB∗
0
W (α)dF (α)
F (αB∗)
R(= V )
v0(xwR)
λR
EE 1λEEF (αEE∗)
CE
v0(xwCE)
λCEF (αCE∗)
All these ingredients are used in the expressions in theorem 4 to obtain the following corollary
which gives the optimal consumption levels in the restricted second best.
Corollary 6: Under asymmetric information, the second best optimal consumption levels satisfy-
ing EWEP have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraint (18) and the following equations:
with
DW =
"Z αW∗
0
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xwW
¢
− α
¢
dF (α) +
Z ∞
αW∗
Ψ0
¡
v
¡
xuW
¢¢
dF (α)
#
,
DB =
Z ∞
0
W (α) dF (α) and DEE = 1/v0
¡
xwEE
¢
.
22
X
³
λX
´−1 γwL+(1−γ)xH−xw+xu)
xw
U gUP
W gWP /D
W
B gBP /D
B 1
η(xwX ,αX∗)
¡
1− gX
¢
R = V gRP
EE gEEP /D
EE
CE gCEP
1
η(xwCE,αCE∗)
£
1− (1− ξ) gCE
¤
NW gNWP
1
η(xwNW ,αNW∗)
¡
1− gNW
¢
− αNW∗−αλNWxwNW
Unsurprisingly, the optimal tax formulas have the same shape as in the previous subsection,
but now the constraint xH = xL is imposed. The major diﬀerence is due to the fact that EWEP
impedes the government to distinguish between low and high-skilled workers, such that the formula
now have to hold for an imaginary worker who has average productivity and thus average wage
γwL + (1− γ)wH .
5.4 Priority principles
The social choice literature to equality of opportunity argues that, since compensation and respon-
sibility cannot be fully satisfied in general, only a maximin variant makes sense (Fleurbaey, 2008).
Therefore, rather than strictly imposing one of the equality of opportunity principles and searching
for the optimal allocation satisfying it, this section examines the optimal tax policies when priority
to the worst oﬀ is given. The strict equality demanded by each of the principles is weakened and
replaced with maximin and we search for social orderings that embody this weak version of the
principle.16
EWEP requires that for each value of α, welfares are equalized. Rather than insisting on full
equality, the priority principle requires that social states are judged, for each α, by the welfare
level obtained by the skill level L or H, that has the lowest welfare. It expresses the idea that the
allocation of consumption levels and jobs between two individuals with identical tastes should be
such it is impossible to redistribute among them and increase the level of well-being of the least
well oﬀ.
The question then becomes how to measure individuals’ welfare. A first possibility is to measure
welfare by individual utilities. Roemer’s criterion applies a Utilitarian aggregation to these minimal
levels of welfare, but other aggregation procedures are possible, such as a Welfaristic and a Boadway
et al. variant, leading to the Priority Welfare weighted Utility ordering
eSPWU = Z ∞
0
ΩR
Ã
min{oper
δL(α)
{v (xwL (α))− α, v (xuL (α))},
oper
δH(α)
{v (xwH (α))− α, v (xuH (α))}}
!
dF (α) , (22)
16For an interesting alternative, social choice approach, starting from such priority principles see Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2005 and 2007).
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where ΩR (·) is a welfare function with ΩR0 (·) > 0 and the Priority Taste weighted Utility ordering
eSPTU = Z ∞
0
ΦR (α)
"
min{oper
δL(α)
{v (xwL (α))− α, v (xuL (α))},
oper
δH(α)
{v (xwH (α))− α, v (xuH (α))}}
#
dF (α) , (23)
where ΦR (α) > 0 weights diﬀerent tastes. These two objective functions are clearly distinct: SPTU
allows the planner to express inequality aversion (preference) with respect to utility diﬀerences
that arise due to diﬀerences in tastes if ΩR00 (·) < (>) 0, while in SPWU the planner gives diﬀerent
weights to diﬀerent tastes as such, irrespective of their welfare levels. Both are generalizations of
Roemer’s criterion but they do not respect the utilitarian reward principle (see Fleurbaey (2008)),
which requires zero aversion to inequalities due to diﬀerent preferences. However, if the planner
wants to express an opinion about welfare inequality that arizes due to diﬀerences in tastes, these
specifications allow the planner to do so.
A second approach consists in taking an ordinal measure of welfare. We can find here inspiration
with the reasoning that leads to the Egalitarian Equivalent ordering, and take that consumption
level a person requires when he works that makes him indiﬀerent to his actual consumption bundle.
The aggregation of these welfare levels can occur again in a Welfarist or a Boadway et al. way,
leading to the Priority Welfare weighted Equivalent ordering
SPWE =
Z ∞
0
ΩO
Ã
min{oper
δL(α)
{xwL (α) , v−1 (v (xuL (α)) + α)},
oper
δH(α)
{xwH (α) , v−1 (v (xuH (α)) + α)}
!
dF (α) , (24)
where ΩO (·) is a welfare function with ΩO0 (·) > 0 and the Priority Taste weighted Equivalent
ordering
SPTE =
Z ∞
0
ΦO (α)
"
min{oper
δL(α)
{xwL (α) , v−1 (v (xuL (α)) + α)},
oper
δH(α)
{xwH (α) , v−1 (v (xuH (α)) + α)}}
#
dF (α) , (25)
where ΦO (α) > 0 weights diﬀerent tastes. If the welfare function ΩO (·) becomes infinitely inequal-
ity averse, the social welfare function (24) reduces to the egalitarian equivalent ordering (9).17
ETES requires that transfers are the same for all those that have equal skills. To apply the
priority principle here, for each level of skill we have to consider the lowest transfer received by an
individual with that skill level. Since we have only two levels of skill, a social ordering embodying
17 In a recent contribution Hodler (2009) proposes to measure inequality in societies with unequal earning abilities
and tastes for work by computing traditional inequality indices (Gini, Atkinson-Kolm ,Theil, ...) for equivalent
wages in the entire population. When interested in inequality, one can do something similar here, but the priority
principle forces us to take, for each value of tastes, only the lowest equivalent wage into account.
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the priority principle would be the following Priority Transfer ordering
SPT = ρmin
α∈R+
(
oper
δL(α)
{xwL (α)− wL, xuL (α)}
)
+(1− ρ) min
α∈R+
(
oper
δH(α)
{xwH (α)− wH , xuH (α)}
)
, (26)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] gives the relative importance attached to the low-skilled agents.
The following lemma gives expressions for these new objective functions in the second best
framework.
Lemma 4: priority social objective functions in the second best.
eSPWU = Z α∗L
0
ΩR (v (xL)− α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
ΩR (v (xu)) dF (α) .
eSPTU = Z α∗L
0
ΦR (α) [v (xL)− α] dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
ΦR (α) v (xu) dF (α) .
eSPWE = Z α∗L
0
ΩO (xL) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
ΩO
¡
v−1 (v (xu) + α)
¢
dF (α) .
eSPTE = xL Z α∗L
0
ΦO (α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
ΦO (α)
¡
v−1 (v (xu) + α)
¢
dF (α) .
eSPT = ρ (xL − wL) + (1− ρ) (xH − wH) .
The problem of finding the optimal tax rates with these objective functions has exactly the
same structure as the General Second Best Problem formulated in section 5.1, and whose solution
is given by theorem 2.
Lemma 5: the value of SXα∗Y (Y = L,H):
SXα∗Y
= 0 for X = PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT .
Lemma 6: the value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
ν ≥ 0 for X = PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT .
Combining lemma 6 with lemma 1 (a) we see how the diﬀerent criteria perform from the EWEP-
perspective: for PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT the constraint xH ≥ xL can be binding, in
which case xH = xL, α∗H = α
∗
L and their solution satisfies EWEP.
The average social marginal utility of consumption gXY under objective function X (= PWU ,
PTU , PWE, PTE or PT ) for agents of skill level Y (= L or H) are given in the following table.
Using these expressions in theorem 2 results in the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the
budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
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X gXL g
X
H
PWU
v0(xPWUL )
λPWU
R αPWU∗L
0 ΩR0(v(xPWUL )−α)dF (α)
γF (αPWU∗L )
0
PTU
v0(xPTUL )
λPTU
R αPTU∗L
0 ΦR(α)dF (α)
γF (αPTU∗L )
0
PWE
ΩO0(xPWEL )
λPWEγ 0
PTE 1λPTEγ
R αPTE∗L
0 ΦO(α)dF (α)
F (αPTE∗L )
0
PT ρ
λPT γF(αPT∗L )
1−ρ
λPT (1−γ)F (αPT∗H )
X
³
λX
´−1
TXH −TXu
xXH
TXL −TXu
xXL
PWU gPWUP /D
PWU
PTU gPTUP /D
PTU 1
η(xXH ,αX∗H )
·
1− νX
λX(1−γ)F(αX∗H )
¸
1
η(xXL ,αX∗L )
PWE gPWEP /D
PWE ×
PTE gPTEP /D
PTE
µ
1− gXL + ν
X
λXγF(αX∗L )
¶
PT gPTP /D
PT 1
η(xPTH ,αPT∗H )
µ
1− gPTH − νλPT (1−γ)F(αPT∗H )
¶
with
DPWU =
Z αPWU∗L
0
ΩR0
¡
v(xPWUL )− α
¢
dF (α) +
Z ∞
αPWU∗L
ΩR0
¡
v
¡
xPWUu
¢¢
dF (α) ,
DPTU =
Z αPTU∗L
0
ΦR (α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
αPTU∗L
ΦR (α) dF (α) ,
DPWE =
ΩO0
¡
xPWEL
¢
F
¡
αPWE∗L
¢
v0
¡
xPWEL
¢ + R∞αPWEL ΩO0 ¡v−1 ¡v ¡xPWEu¢+ α¢¢ ∂(v
−1(v(xPWEu)+α))
∂xPWEu dF (α)
v0 (xPWEu)
DPTE =
R αPTE∗L
0
ΦO (α) dF (α)
v0(xPTEL )
+
R∞
αPTE∗L
ΦO (α)
∂(v−1(v(xPTEu)+α))
∂xPTEu dF (α)
v0 (xPTEu)
DPT =
ρ
v0
¡
xPTL
¢ + 1− ρ
v0(xPTH )
The optimal tax rates have the same structure under the PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT
social objective functions in the sense that the multiplier ν pushes the tax system away from the
EITC. This is shown in the next lemma.
Corollary 8. Optimality of EITC or NIT in second best with a priority requirement.
Social Objective ETES/ NIT/ EITC?
PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT NIT (EITC) if gXL < (>) 1 +
νX
λXγF(αX∗L )
Under assumption 1, we can derive the following counterparts to corollaries 4 and 5.18
18Again, ν > 0 we have η
¡
xL,α∗L
¢
= η
¡
xH ,α∗H
¢
= η (x,α∗). Moreover, the proof of the corollaries is similar to
the proofs of corollaries 4 and 5 for the Roemer, EE and CE social objective functions, and is suppressed.
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Corollary 9. Under assumption 1, for the PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT social objective
functions:
(TL − Tu) /xL < (TH − Tu) /xH
Corollary 10. Under assumption 1, for the PWU , PTU , PWE, PTE and PT social objective
functions , the labor supply of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply
of the low-skilled.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied optimal tax policies when agents diﬀer in terms of skills and tastes for labor.
We assumed quasilinear utility and that labor supply decision is at the extensive margin. The
optimal tax policies under distinct objective functions have been derived, in full and asymmetric
information.
The determination of appealing social criteria is important if one looks for social preferences
applicable in public economics, in particular when dealing with redistribution. When agents diﬀer
in terms of skills and tastes for labor, the equality of opportunity approach is inspiring (Fleurbaey,
1995a) and broadly accepted (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
This paper has shown that many criteria in the optimal tax literature (Utilitarianism, Wel-
farism, Boadway et al., Van de gaer and Non-Welfarist criteria) fail the requirements of equality
of opportunity, i.e. the compensation (EWEP) and responsibility (ETES) principles. It has been
shown that, in the first best, criteria respecting one of these principles are Roemer’s, the Condi-
tional Equality and the Egalitarian Equivalent criterion, the latter two advocated by Fleurbaey
(1995b). Given that these criteria were designed so as to meet one of the principles in the first
best, this should not come as a surprise. We also showed that in the second best, these criteria
might satisfy EWEP, while the standard criteria from the optimal tax literature never satisfy it.
The diﬀerence between the standard approaches and the equality of opportunity approach is not
just a diﬀerence between the way social marginal utilities of incomes of individuals are aggregated,
but goes much deeper.
In this paper, we explore two ways to deal with the equality of opportunity principles in the
second best model. One is to search for optimal policies over the allocations that satisfy one of
the principles. The other is to weaken the full equality demanded in the equality of opportunity
principles, and replace them by priority principles, as advocated in social choice (Fleurbaey, 2008).
We therefore build up new criteria; one satisfying an ETES-priority principle and several others
satisfying EWEP-priority principles leading to generalizations of Roemer’s criterion and the egal-
itarian equivalent allocation. They have similar properties to the other equality of opportunity
principles, but allow the researcher to express diﬀerent kinds and extents of inequality aversion.
Throughout we find that the equality of opportunity approach tends to work against an Earned
Income Tax Credit and in favor of a Negative Income Tax.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Section 4.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1a.
The Lagrangian functions for each of the social objective functions are formed by combining the
expressions for the social objective functions given in Section 3.2, the government budget constraint
(1) and its associated Lagrangian multiplier λ.
(a) Welfarist and (b) Utilitarian planners
We discuss the Welfarist case first, and show how the properties of the Utilitarian case fol-
low. The first-order conditions of the constrained optimization problem with respect to the four
consumption functions are:
δL (α) [Ψ0(v(xwL (α))− α)v0(xwL (α))− λ] = 0,
(1− δL (α)) [Ψ0(v(xuL (α))v0(xuL (α))− λ] = 0,
δH (α) [Ψ0(v(xwH (α))− α)v0(xwH (α))− λ] = 0,
(1− δH (α)) [Ψ0(v(xuH (α))v0(xuH (α))− λ] = 0.
Since δL (α) and δH (α) are equal to 1 or 0, for each value of α, only two of these first-order
conditions matter; for those that matter the corresponding social marginal utilities of consumption
have to be equal, for the other two the consumption function does not matter (as nobody with
this value for α is receiving it). So we get for all those that do not work:
Ψ0(v(xuL (α)))v
0(xuL (α)) = λ = Ψ
0(v(xuH (α)))v
0(xuH (α)) . (27)
Due to the strict concavity of Ψ0(·) and v0(·), this can only hold true if
xu = xuL (α) = x
u
H (α) .
For those that work, we get
Ψ0(v(xwL (α))− α)v0(xwL (α)) = λ = Ψ0(v(xwH (α))− α)v0(xwH (α)) . (28)
For a given value for α, the requirement is exactly the same for wL- and wH-workers. Hence,
for a given value of α, both get the same consumption bundle and so, for all α :
xwL (α) = x
w
H (α) . (29)
Hence worker’s consumption bundles depend on α. Moreover, from the implicit function theorem:
∂xwL (α)
∂α
=
Ψ00(v(xwL (α))− α)v0(xwL (α))
Ψ00(v(xwL (α))− α) [v0(xwL (α))]
2 +Ψ0(v(xwL (α))− α)v00(xwL (α))
> 0, (30)
Therefore, for α1 < α2, due to the concavity of v (.) we have:
v0(xwL (α1)) > v
0(xwL (α2)).
Combining the last inequality with (28) requires that Ψ0(v(xwL (α1))− α1) < Ψ0(v(xwL (α2))− α2).
Since Ψ is strictly concave, this requires that
v (xwL (α1))− α1 > v(xwL (α2))− α2,
30
and so low-skilled workers with a higher disutility of labor are not fully compensated for this higher
disutility. Due to (29), the same holds for high-skilled workers. Note that from (28) with α = 0
and (27) we get that
xwL (0) = x
w
H (0) = xu.
The government budget constraint only depends on the number of high and low-skilled that
work, not on which high and low-skilled. From (30) workers’ consumption is increasing in their
disutility of work, and so it is cheapest and hence optimal for the government to make those work
with the lowest α. In view of (29), putting high-skilled and low-skilled at work is equally expensive
for the government, but since high-skilled contribute more to the budget than low-skilled, more
high-skilled than low-skilled will have to work. Hence, there exist critical values for α∗L and α
∗
H
such that
δL (α) = 1 for all α ≤ α∗L, δH (α) = 1 for all α ≤ α∗H and α∗L < α∗H . (31)
The Welfarist criterion reduces to the Utilitarian one when Ψ(.)
def≡ id(.) hence Ψ0(.) = 1.
Therefore, under the Utilitarian criterion, (27)-(28) yield that the first-order conditions with respect
to consumption reduce to (∀α) (since λ is a constant):
v0(xwUL (α)) = v
0(xuUL (α)) = v
0(xwUH (α)) = v
0(xuUH (α)) = λ
⇐⇒ x = xwUL (α) = xuUL (α) = xwUH (α) = xuUH (α) . (32)
Since all individuals get the same consumption bundle, it follows from the reasoning leading to
(31) that αU∗L < α
U∗
H .
(c) Boadway et al. planner
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption functions (assuming an interior solution)
are: Z ∞
0
δL (α) [W (α) v0(xwL (α))− λ] dF (α) = 0,Z ∞
0
(1− δL (α)) [W (α) v0(xuL (α))− λ] dF (α) = 0,Z ∞
0
δH (α) [W (α) v0(xwH (α))− λ] dF (α) = 0,Z ∞
0
(1− δH (α)) [W (α) v0(xuH (α))− λ] dF (α) = 0.
Consequently, we get
v0(xwL (α)) = v
0(xuL (α)) = v
0(xwH (α)) = v
0(xuH (α)) =
λ
W (α)
⇐⇒ x (α) = xwL (α) = xuL (α) = xwH (α) = xuH (α) . (33)
Given α, it is equally costly to have high and low-skilled at work, but since high skilled workers
contribute more to the government budget, the government always prefers to have more high than
low-skilled at work. From (33), consumption depends on taste for leisure. Application of the
implicit function theorem to the equation v0 (x (α)) = λW (α) yields:
∂x (α)
∂α
= − λ
[W (α)]2
W 0 (α)
v00 (x (α))
≥ (≤) 0 if W 0 (.) ≥ (≤) 0.
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Using (33) in the government budget constraint (1) yields that the function x (α) must be such
that Z ∞
0
x (α) dF (α) = γwLnL + (1− γ)wHnH −R.
For the government budget constraint it only matters how many high and low-skilled people
work, it does not matter which high and low-skilled people work. Hence, diﬀerential treatment in
job assignment between equally skilled people must be based on the objective function. Using (4),
the value of the objective function is given by:
SB =
Z ∞
0
W (α) v (x (α)) dF (α)−γ
Z ∞
0
W (α) δL (α)αdF (α)−(1− γ)
Z ∞
0
W (α) δH (α)αdF (α) .
Whether people with high or low disutility of eﬀort should be working depends on the last two
terms of this expression. If W (α) a is increasing, having people with a high disutility working is
not a good idea. From this it follows that, if the elasticity of the weight function (∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) )
is larger than −1, then it is optimal for the government not to employ people that have a high
disutility of work. If this elasticity is smaller than −1, it will be optimal to employ people with a
high disutility of work. Consequently, the functions δL (α) and δH (α) can have diﬀerent shapes:
Case 1: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) > −1 : δL (α) = 1 for all α ≤ α∗L, δH (α) = 1 for all α ≤ α∗H and α∗L < α∗H ,
Case 2: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) = −1 (i.e. W (α)α is a constant): see discussion below,
Case 3: ∂W (α)∂α
α
W (α) < −1 : δL (α) = 1 for all α ≥ α∗∗L , δH (α) = 1 for all α ≥ α∗∗H and α∗L > α∗H .
Analyzing case 2 in more detail, the problem facing the planner with W (α)α constant has the
following Lagrangian:
$ (x (α) , nL, nH ,λ) =
Z ∞
0
W (α) v (x (α)) dF (α)− γW (α)αnL − (1− γ)W (α)αnH
+λ
·
γwLnL + (1− γ)wHnH −
Z ∞
0
x (α) dF (α)−R
¸
,
which leads to the following:
∂$
∂x (α)
= 0⇔ λ =
Z ∞
0
W (α) v0 (x (α)) dF (α) ,
∂$
∂nL
= −γW (α)α+ λγwL,
∂$
∂nH
= (1− γ)W (α)α+ λ (1− γ)wH .
Note that the second and third condition cannot hold simultaneously with equality:
∂$
∂nL
≥ (≤) 0⇔ [λwL −W (α)α] ≥ (≤) 0,
∂$
∂nH
≥ (≤) 0⇔ [λwH −W (α)α] ≥ (≤) 0.
Hence, since wH > wL, we always have that ∂$∂nL ≥ 0 ⇒
∂$
∂nH
> 0 and ∂$∂nH ≤ 0 ⇒
∂$
∂nL
< 0. We
then get the possibilities listed in case 2 of the theorem.
(d) Non-Welfarist social planner
It is easy to see that we obtain the same first-order conditions as with the Utilitarian objective,
and so the consumption functions are similar to (32): everybody receives the same level of con-
sumption x, which, because of the government budget constraint equals γwLnL+(1− γ)wHnH−R.
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Consequently, using (5), the value of our Non-Welfaristic objective function becomes
v (γwLnL + (1− γ)wHnH)− γαnL − (1− γ)αnH .
This expression only depends on the number of low and high-skilled that are employed; the
planner determines nL and nH so as to maximize this expression. The derivatives of this expression
with respect to nH and nL are, respectively
(1− γ) [wHv0 (x)− α] and γ [wLv0 (x)− α] .
Since wH > wL, we can distinguish the cases listed in the theorem.
(e) Roemer planner
There is no point in allowing the two elements in the min operator of Roemer’s objective
function to be diﬀerent in the first best. Hence there are in principle four possibilities:
(i) δL (α) = δH (α) = 1⇒ xwL (α) = xwH (α) ,
(ii) δL (α) = 0, δH (α) = 1⇒ v (xuL (α)) = v (xwH (α))− α⇒ xuL (α) < xwH (α) ,
(iii) δL (α) = δH (α) = 0⇒ xuL (α) = xuH (α) ,
(iv) δL (α) = 1, δH (α) = 0⇒ v (xwL (α))− α = v (xuH (α))⇒ xwL (α) > xuH (α) .
There is equivalence between the maximin approach and the revenue-maximizing approach.
Maximizing tax revenue subject to a minimal utility level is equivalent to maximizing the minimum
of utility subject to the revenue constraint. Here, the objective function maximizes the sum of
the minimal utility levels but the logic is similar. The government maximizes the tax revenue
subject to minimal utility levels. The tax revenue will be maximized the more people are working,
in particular productive people. The minimal utility levels avoid that people with large α work.
Therefore, if anyone, we would like the ones with low values for α to work, and since highly skilled
have a higher productivity, we want more highly skilled to work (α∗H ≥ α∗L); for α increasing, we
move from (i) over (ii) to (iii). If we plug this in, we get the following objective function:Z α∗L
0
min {v (xwL (α))− α, v (xwH (α))− α} dF (α)
+
Z α∗H
α∗L
min {v (xuL (α)) , v (xwH (α))− α} dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗H
min {v (xuL (α)) , v(xuH (α))} dF (α) .
Maximizing this objective function implies
xwL (α) = x
w
H (α) ∀α ∈ [0,α∗L), (34)
xuL (α) = v
−1 (v (xwH (α))− α) ∀α ∈ [α∗L,α∗H), (35)
xuL (α) = x
u
H (α) ∀α ∈ [α∗H ,∞). (36)
Therefore, the objective function can be rewritten asZ α∗L
0
(v (xwL (α))− α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
v (xuL (α)) dF (α) . (37)
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The government budget constraint (1) can be formulated as follows:
γ
"Z α∗L
0
(wL − xwL (α)) dF (α)−
Z α∗H
α∗L
xuL (α) dF (α)
#
+(1− γ)
"Z α∗L
0
(wH − xwL(α)) dF (α) +
Z α∗H
α∗L
¡
wH − v−1 (v (xuL (α) + α))
¢
dF (α)
#
−
Z ∞
α∗H
xuL (α) dF (α) ≥ R.
Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (37), the previous government budget con-
straint and the Lagrangian multiplier λ, the first-order conditions with respect to xwL (α) and
xuL (α) are:
α ≤ α∗L : v0 (xwL (α)) = λ,
α∗H < α : v
0(xuL (α)) = λ,
α∗L < α ≤ α∗H : v0(xuL (α)) = λ
·
γ + (1− γ) v
0 (xuL (α))
v0 (xwH (α))
¸
.
From the first and second first-order conditions, we have (since λ is constant):
∀α ∈ [0,α∗L) ∪ [α∗H ,∞) : xwL (α) = xuL (α) = x.
For α∗L < α ≤ α∗H , from (35), it follows that xuL (α) < xwH (α) and so v0 (xuL (α)) > v0 (xwH (α)), such
that v0(xuL (α)) > λ and
∀α ∈ [α∗L,α∗H) : xuL (α) < x.
(f) Van de gaer planner:
In the first best, there is no reason for having diﬀerent values for opportunity sets of diﬀerent
skill-types. For the same reasons as usual, if anybody works, it will be those with a low disutility
of work. Hence the objective function reduces to:Z α∗L
0
[v(xwL (α))− α] dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
v (xuL (α)) dF (α) . (38)
This objective function must be maximized subject to two constraints. The first is that both
opportunity sets must have the same value:Z α∗L
0
[v(xwL (α))− α] dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
v (xuL (α)) dF (α)
=
Z α∗H
0
[v (xwH (α))− α] dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗H
v (xuH (α)) dF (α) . (39)
The second is the budget constraint:
γ
"Z α∗L
0
(wL − xwL (α)) dF (α)−
Z ∞
α∗L
xuL (α) dF (α)
#
+(1− γ)
"Z α∗H
0
(wH − xwH (α)) dF (α)−
Z ∞
α∗H
xuH (α) dF (α)
#
= R. (40)
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Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (38), the equality of opportunity set constraint
(39) with the associated Lagrangian multiplier μ and the government budget constraint (40) with
its Lagrangian multiplier λ, the first-order conditions with respect to xwL (α), x
u
L (α), x
w
H (α) and
xuH (α) are:
v0 (xwL (α)) (1 + μ) = λγ, (41)
v0 (xuL (α)) (1 + μ) = λγ, (42)
−μv0 (xwH (α)) = λ (1− γ) , (43)
−μv0 (xuH (α)) = λ (1− γ) . (44)
From (41)-(42) and (43)-(44) respectively, we have:
xwL (α) = x
u
L (α) = x and x
w
H (α) = x
u
H (α) = x.
Substituting these two equations into the equality of opportunity sets constraint (39) gives:
v(x)−
Z α∗L
0
αdF (α) = v(x)−
Z α∗H
0
αdF (α) .
If α∗L = α
∗
H , then x = x. However, such a situation cannot be optimal, as high-skilled workers
contribute more to the government budget than low-skilled workers. Therefore, α∗L < α
∗
H hence
x < x.
LEMMA A.
Lemma A: for an allocation that satisfies EWEP and ETES, there cannot exist an α ∈ R+ :
δL (α) 6= δH (α).
Proof. If such an α existed, we would have by EWEP that for this value either v (xuL (α)) =
v (xwH (α)) − α or v (xwL (α)) − α = v (xuH (α)), both of which are impossible since by ETES the
consumption bundles cannot depend on α.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1b.
(a) FEO allocation: in view of Lemma A, we have that for all α : δL (α) = δH (α). Suppose
there exists an allocation satisfying EWEP and ETES in which some people work and others do
not work. From ETES we know that all low-skilled in work have to get the same consumption
bundle, which with some abuse of notation we denote as xwL . Similarly, all high-skilled in work get
the same consumption bundle, denoted as xwH . In addition, by ETES, we need (i) x
w
L − wL = xuL
and (ii) xwH − wH = xuH . EWEP requires that xuL = xuH . Combining this with (i) and (ii) we get
that xwL = wL − wH + xwH , which because EWEP requires xwL = xwH , reduces to wL = wH , which
was excluded by assumption. Hence an allocation that satisfies EWEP and ETES cannot have
some people working and others not working.
It is easy to verify that the allocations (i) and (ii) satisfy both axioms. Their consumption
bundles follow from the government budget constraint (1).
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(b) CE allocation: a first thing to note is that for the allocation to equalize u (xY (α) , δY (α) , eα)
for all α and Y = L,H requires that utility is independent of wY . This has the following implica-
tions:
i) for all α such that δL (α) = δH (α) = 1 ⇒ xwL (α) = xwH (α). In addition, all those assigned
in a job have to get the same level of utility, which implies that their consumption bundle cannot
depend on α, and thus xwL = x
w
L (α) = x
w
H (α) = x
w
H ;
ii) for all α such that δL (α) = δH (α) = 0 ⇒ xuL (α) = xuH (α). In addition, all those that
are inactive have to get the same level of utility, implying that their consumption bundle cannot
depend on α, such that xuL (α) = x
u
H (α) = x
u;
iii) for all α such that δL (α) = 1 and δH (α) = 0 ⇒ xwL (α) = v−1 (v (xuH (α)) + eα), which
combined with case (i) and (ii) gives xwL = v
−1 (v (xu) + eα) ;
iv) for all α such that δL (α) = 0 and δH (α) = 1 ⇒ xwH (α) = v−1 (v (xuL (α)) + eα), which
combined with case 1 and 2 gives xwH = v
−1 (v (xu) + eα) .
Combining these results, we get
xwL = x
w
H = v
−1 (v (xu) + eα) .
Everybody gets the same level of utility v (xu) in the optimum, and so the problem of the first
best allocation then amounts to maximize the equal utility level v (xu) with respect to xu, nL and
nH subject to the budget constraint
R ≤ γ
¡
wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¢nL − γxu [1− nL]
+ (1− γ)
¡
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¢nH − (1− γ)xu [1− nH ] .
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L = v (xu) + λ[γ
¡
wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¢nL − γxu [1− nL]
+ (1− γ)
¡
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¢nH − (1− γ)xu [1− nH ]−R].
Taking derivatives, we get :
∂L
∂xu = v
0 (xu) + λγ ∂v
−1(v(xu)+eα)
∂xu nL + λ (1− γ)
∂v−1(v(xu)+eα)
∂xu nH
−λγ [1− nL]− λ (1− γ) [1− nH ] = 0,
∂L
∂nL
= λγ
£
wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤+ λγxu = λγ £xu + £wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤¤ ,
∂L
∂nH
= λ (1− γ)
£
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤nH + λ (1− γ)xunH
= λ (1− γ)
£
xu +
£
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤¤ .
The two last first-order derivatives cannot possibly both be equal to zero at the same time:
wH > wL ⇒ wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα) > wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)
⇒ xu +
£
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤ > xu + £wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤ .
Hence we either have that
(i) ∂L∂nL > 0⇒
∂L
∂nH
> 0, implying that nH = 1 = nL,
(ii) −xu =
£
wL − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤ and ∂L∂nH > 0, implying nH = 1 and nL follows from the
budget constraint,
(iii) ∂L∂nH > 0 and
∂L
∂nL
> 0, implying that nH = 1 and nL = 0,
(iv)−xu =
£
wH − v−1 (v (xu) + eα)¤ and ∂L∂nL < 0, implying nL = 0 and nH follows from the
budget constraint or
(v) ∂L∂nH < 0⇒
∂L
∂nL
< 0, implying that nH = 0 = nL.
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Which of these allocations yields the highest value for v (xu) depends on the parameters of the
model. If eα is suﬃciently low, the optimum will be case (i), as eα rises, we move from (i) to (ii),
as it increases further we move to (iii) and (iv) and for values of eα suﬃciently high, the optimum
will be case (v).
(c) EE allocation: we want everybody to be indiﬀerent between his actual resources (consump-
tion and activity) and a reference resource bundle where he works and gets consumption ex. The
best thing to do is to give all employed exactly this reference consumption bundle: xwL = x
w
H = ex.
Clearly, to bring the equivalent wage of the inactive with a very high α down can lead to negative
consumption levels. To prevent this, we impose that xuY (α) ≥ 0. If this constraint is binding,
these individuals get an equivalent wage larger than ex; we have to give up the ideal of equaliz-
ing equivalent incomes. The logical alternative then becomes Fleurbaey and Maniquet’s maximin
solution.
To get an equivalent wage of exactly ex, a person with taste parameter α needs an inactivity
transfer equal to v−1 (v (ex)− α), which is independent of his skill level. Since we maximin the
equivalent wages, the transfer for the inactive is xu (α) = min
©
v−1 (v (ex)− α) , 0ª. There exists
a value for α, say bα, such that, if α ≤ bα we have xu (α) = v−1 (v (ex)− α) ≥ 0, and if α > bα,
xu (α) = 0. In both cases, xu (α) ≤ ex such that it is cheaper to have people inactive than to have
them working.
However, working people produce wL or wH , while inactive people produce nothing. As a conse-
quence, it can never be optimal to have people inactive for which α ≤ bα: they cost v−1 (v (ex)− α) ≥
0, but produce nothing. The best policy that maximizes SEE under budget constraint is therefore
xwL = x
w
H = γwL + (1− γ)wH −R, xu = 0 and α∗L = α∗H = v (γwL + (1− γ)wH)− v (0) .
Appendix B: Proofs of section 5.1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.
(a) Suppose the proposition does not hold true. By (13), we then have that α∗H > α
∗
L. In that
case, there exist α, α∗L < α < α
∗
H for which highly skilled workers get utility v (xH)− α and lowly
skilled workers get v (xu). Since the former depends on α, but the latter doesn’t these two can
never be equal for all α, α∗L < α < α
∗
H , and so EWEP must be violated.
(b) Follows immediately from the second best context and the definition of ETES.
PROOF OF SOCIAL OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS IN SECOND BEST.
Parts (a), (b), (c) and (d) are straightforward to prove.
To see part (e), observe that (11) (due to incentive constraints) implies that for all α, v(xL)−α ≤
v(xH)− α. Therefore, Roemer’s objective functionZ ∞
0
min{oper
δL(α)
{v (xL)− α, v (xu)}, oper
δH(α)
{v (xH)− α, v (xu)}}dF (α)
becomes Z α∗L
0
(v (xL)− α) dF (α) +
Z ∞
α∗L
v (xu) dF (α) . (45)
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To see part (f), note that, in second best, Van de gaer’s objective function is
min{
Z ∞
0
oper
δL(α)
{v (xL)− α, v (xu)}dF (α) ,
Z ∞
0
oper
δH(α)
{v (xH)− α, v (xu)}dF (α)}.
Due to the incentive constraints, this reduces to (45).
To see part (g), observe that, since the policy can no longer depend on α, (8) reduces to
eSC = min {u (xL (δL) , δL, eα) , u (xH (δH) , δH , eα)} ,
where, for Y = L or H, δY = 1 or 0 and xY (δY ) = xY if δY = 1 and xY (δY ) = xu if δY = 0.
However, since (11) holds true, the first element in the set behind the min sign is always the
smallest; the low skilled will always be the worst oﬀ and
eSC = min {v (xL)− eα, v (xu)} . (46)
If maximization of v (xL) − eα yields a value α∗L > eα, then v (xL) − eα > v (xL) − α∗L = v (xu),
and so objective function (46) was not maximized. To prevent this from occurring, we maximize
v (xL) − eα subject to the constraint that eα ≥ α∗L. The multiplier associated to this constraint is
denoted by ξ.
To see part (h), note that the equivalent wages for the employed are equal to xY (Y = H or
L) and for the inactive v−1 (v (xu) + α). The objective is to maximize the lowest equivalent wage.
Consider the inactive. Since v−1 (.) is an increasing function, the equivalent wage is lowest for
those inactive having the lowest value for α; which are those with α = α∗L. Hence the lowest value
for the equivalent wage is v−1 (v (xu) + α∗L) = v
−1 (v (xL)) = xL.
Appendix C: Proofs of Section 5.2.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.
The Lagrangian function for the general second best problem is
$ = SX (xL, xH , x
u,α∗L,α
∗
H ,λ,μL,μH , ν, c)
+λ {γ (wL − xL)F (α∗L)− γxu (1− F (α∗L))
+ (1− γ) (wH − xH)F (α∗H)− (1− γ)xu (1− F (α∗H))−R}
+μL [v (xL)− α∗L − v (xu)]
+μH [v (xH)− α∗H − v (xu)]
+ν (xH − xL − c) ,
which has to be maximized with respect to xL, xH , xu, α∗L, α
∗
H and c, taking into account that
c ≥ 0. This leads to the following first-order conditions:
SXxL − λγF (α∗L)− ν = −μLv0(xL), (47)
SXxu − λ [γ(1− F (α∗L)) + (1− γ)(1− F (α∗H))] = (μL + μH)v0(xu), (48)
SXxH − λ(1− γ)F (α∗H) + ν = −μHv0(xH), (49)
SXα∗L + λγf(α
∗
L)(wL − xL + xu) = μL, (50)
SXα∗H + λ (1− γ) f (α
∗
H) (wH − xH + xu) = μH , (51)
−ν ≤ 0 and νc = 0. (52)
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Solving (47) for μL and equating the resulting expression to the LHS of (50), we obtain
SXα∗L + λγf(α
∗
L)(wL − xL + xu)
=
λγF (α∗L)
v0(xL)
− S
X
xL
v0(xL)
+
ν
v0(xL)
,
from which
wL − xL + xu =
F (α∗L)
f(α∗L)v0(xL)
·
1− S
X
xL − ν
λγF (α∗L)
¸
−
SXα∗L
λγf (α∗L)
.
Using the definition (14), we get
wL − xL + xu
xL
=
1
η (xL,α∗L)
·
1− S
X
xL − ν
λγF (α∗L)
¸
−
SXα∗L
λγf (α∗L)xL
.
Similarly, solving (49) for μH , equating the resulting expression to the LHS of (51) and using
definition (15), we get
wH − xH + xu
xH
=
1
η (xH ,α∗H)
·
1− S
X
xH + ν
λ (1− γ)F (α∗H)
¸
−
SXα∗H
λ (1− γ) f (α∗H)xH
.
Divide the equations (47)-(49) by the marginal utility on their RHS, adding the resulting
equation for (47) and (49) and equating the result to (49) yields
λγF (α∗L)
v0(xL)
− S
X
xL
v0(xL)
+
ν
v0(xL)
+
λ (1− γ)F (α∗H)
v0(xH)
− S
X
xH
v0(xH)
− ν
v0(xH)
=
SXxu
v0 (xu)
− λ [γ(1− F (α
∗
L)) + (1− γ)(1− F (α∗H))]
v0 (xu)
.
Collecting the terms in λ gives
λ
·
γF (α∗L)
v0(xL)
+
(1− γ)F (α∗H)
v0(xH)
+
[γ(1− F (α∗L)) + (1− γ)(1− F (α∗H))]
v0 (xu)
¸
=
SXxL
v0(xL)
+
SXxH
v0(xH)
+
SXxu
v0 (xu)
+ ν
·
1
v0(xH)
− 1
v0(xL)
¸
.
Now, note that from (52), if ν > 0, then c = 0, such that xH = xL and the last term in
the above equation always drops out. Using definitions (16) and (17) gives λgXP = D
X , and thus
λ−1 = gXP /D
X .
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.
Follows immediately from partially diﬀerentiating the expressions for SX with respect to α∗L
and α∗H .
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.
Step 1: we proof the following lemma:
Lemma B: If, evaluated at xH = xL and α∗H = α
∗
L,
SXxH
+SXα∗
H
v0(x)
1−γ =
SXxL
+SXα∗
L
v0(x)
γ , then ν = 0.
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Proof:
Using (51) in (49) and solving for ν, we obtain
ν = −SXxH − SXα∗Hv
0 (xH)
+λ (1− γ) [F (α∗H)− f (α∗H) (wH − xH + xu) v0 (xH)] .
Hence, ν > 0 (such that xH = xL = x and α∗H = α
∗
L = α
∗) if and only if
F (α∗)− (wH − x+ xu) f (α∗) v0 (x) >
SXxH + S
X
α∗H
v0 (x)
λ (1− γ) . (53)
Similarly, using (47) in (50) and solving for ν,
ν = SXxL + S
X
α∗L
v0 (xL)
−λγ [F (α∗L)− f (α∗L) (wL − xL + xu) v0 (xL)] ,
we find that ν > 0 if and only if
F (α∗)− [wL − x+ xu] f (α∗) v0 (x) <
SXxL + S
X
α∗L
v0 (x)
λγ
. (54)
If the antecedent of lemma B holds true, the right hand sides of (53) and (54) are equal, such
that ν > 0 requires
F (α∗)− (wH − x+ xu) f (α∗) v0 (x) > F (α∗)− [wL − x+ xu] f (α∗) v0 (x) ,
but this can only hold true if wH < wL, which goes against the model’s assumptions.
Step 2: we compute the expressions in that occur in lemma B. They are given in the following
table.
X
SXxL
γ
SXxH
1−γ
SXα∗
L
γ
SXα∗
H
1−γ
U v0 (x)F (α∗) v0 (x)F (α∗) 0 0
W v0 (x)
R α∗
0
Ψ0 (v (x)− α) dF (α) v0 (x)
R α∗
0
Ψ0 (v (x)− α) dF (α) 0 0
B v0 (x)
R α∗
0
W (α) dF (α) v0 (x)
R α∗
0
W (α) dF (α) 0 0
R = V v0 (x)F (α∗) 0 0 0
EE 1/γ 0 0 0
CE19 v0 (x) 0 0 0
NW v0 (x)F (α∗) v0 (x)F (α∗) [α∗ − α] f (α∗) [α∗ − α] f (α∗)
Clearly, for X = U,W,B and NW , by lemma B, ν = 0.
PROOF OF FOOTNOTE 12.
Step 1: we proof the following Lemma:
Lemma C: xXH > x
X
L for X = U,W,B and NW .
Proof:
Under X = U, W, B and NW , ν = 0 from lemma 3. Assume xH = xL = x hence α∗H = α
∗
L =
α∗. Combining equations (47) and (50) gives:
SXxL
γ
= λF (α∗)− v
0 (x)
γ
h
SXα∗L + λγf(α
∗)(wL − x+ xu)
i
.
19Under the assumption that the constraint eα ≥ α∗ is not binding.
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Combining equations (49) and (51) we can write:
SXxH
1− γ = λF (α
∗)− v
0 (x)
1− γ
h
SXα∗H + λ (1− γ) f (α
∗) (wH − x+ xu)
i
.
Using SXxL/γ = S
X
xH/ (1− γ), SXα∗L/γ = S
X
α∗H
/ (1− γ) for X = U,W,B and NW from the
previous table, the two previous equations yield λf(α∗)(wL − x + xu) = λf(α∗) (wH − x+ xu)
but this can only hold true if wH = wL, which leads to a contradiction. We can conclude that
xH > xL.
From lemma C, (10) and (12) we have α∗H > α
∗
L under the U,W,B and NW criteria.
Step 2: in second best, α∗H , α
∗
L <∞.
Proof. As ∀α : f(α) > 0, all low-ability (high-ability) people work means α∗L →∞ (α∗H →∞) at
the optimum. Since consumption levels are finite, from (10) and (resp. (12)), α∗L and α
∗
H cannot
tend to ∞.
Step 3: α∗L > 0 when ν = 0.
Proof. Suppose α∗L = 0. From (10), evaluated at α
∗
L = 0, we have xL = x
u. Since ν = 0 and
F (0) = 0, from first-order condition (47), μL = −SXxL/v0 (xu). The value α∗L = 0 can only be
optimal if ∂$/∂α∗L|α∗L=0 ≤ 0, which requires, using the previous results
λγf(0)wL ≤ −SXα∗L − S
X
xL/v
0 (xu) ,
Going back to the table in this appendix, it is clear that for all the criteria the right hand side
is negative, such that α∗L = 0 can only be optimal if wL < 0, which, however, was excluded by
assumption.
Step 4: to complete the proof, note that we have shown that, for the U , W , B, and NW
criterion, ν = 0, such that xH > xL (using lemma C) and thus α∗H > α
∗
L. For X = R, EE and
CE, we have shown that ν ≥ 0, such that α∗H ≥ α∗L.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.
The proof is obvious from the table in corollary 2.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.
Welfarist optimum.
Since xH > xL, v (xL)−α < v (xH)−α and sinceΨ00 < 0, Ψ0 (v (xL)− α1) > Ψ0 (v (xH)− α1) >
Ψ0 (v (xH)− α2) when α2 > α1, such that gWH < gWL . Combined with η (xL,α∗L) ≥ η (xH ,α∗H), it
follows from the expressions in theorem 2, that (TL − Tu) /xL < (TH − Tu) /xH .
Boadway et al. optimum.
Note that R α∗L
0
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗L)
≥ (≤)
R α∗H
0
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗H)
⇔
R α∗L
0
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗L)
≥ (≤)
R α∗L
0
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗L)
F (α∗L)
F (α∗H)
+
R α∗H
α∗L
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗H)
⇔
R α∗L
0
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗L)
≥ (≤)
R α∗H
α∗L
W (α) dF (α)
F (α∗H)− F (α∗L)
,
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which holds as ≥ automatically ifW (α) is a decreasing function, and as ≤ ifW (α) is an increasing
function.
Therefore, assume that W (α) is a decreasing function hence gBL > g
B
H . Since xH > xL, such
that v0 (xH) < v0 (xL), and the assumption that η (xL,α∗L) ≥ η (xH ,α∗H), it follows from the
expressions in theorem 2, that (TL − Tu) /xL < (TH − Tu) /xH .
Roemer, EE and CE (when ξ < 1).
There are two cases to consider:
(i) When ν = 0, the proof is straightforward from the table in corollary 2, η (xL,α∗L) ≥
η (xH ,α∗H) and g
X
L > 0.
(ii) When ν > 0, xH = xL = x hence, TY = wY − x (Y = L,H) which, combined with
wH > wL, yields the inequality (TL − Tu) /xL < (TH − Tu) /xH (where xH = xL).20
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.
By definition, TL−TuxL <
TH−Tu
xH
⇔ wL−xL+xuxL <
wH−xH+xu
xH
. Therefore under assumption 1,
from corollary 4, we have that for the planners considered in the corollary, xH (wL − xL + xu) <
xL (wH − xH + xu). Since xH ≥ xL (from (11)), we have: wL − xL + xu < wH − xH + xu.
Appendix D: Proofs of Section 5.3
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.
From the government budget constraint, we have that
γ
Z α∗L
0
(wL − xL) dF (α) + γ
Z ∞
α∗L
xudF (α)
+ (1− γ)
Z α∗H
0
(wH − xH) dF (α) + (1− γ)
Z ∞
α∗H
xudF (α) = R.
Substituting the ETES constraints wL − xL = −xu and wH − xH = −xu and rearranging gives
the first expression in the lemma. The second and third expression follow from (10) and (12), the
definitions of the critical values a∗L and α
∗
H .
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.
The Lagrangian is
$ = SX (xw, xu,α∗,λ,μ)
+λ {[γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw]F (α∗)− xu (1− F (α∗))−R}
+μ [v (xx)− α∗ − v (xu)] .
The first-order conditions are
SXxw − λF (α∗) = −μv0 (xw) , (55)
SXxu − λ (1− F (α∗)) = μv0 (xu) , (56)
SXα∗ + λ [γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw + xu] f (α∗) = μ. (57)
20Note that using xL = xH and α∗L = α
∗
H into (14)-(15) yields η
¡
xL,α∗L
¢
= η
¡
xL,α∗L
¢
.
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Combining (55) and (57),
γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw + xu =
F (α∗)
v0 (xw) f (α∗)
·
1− S
X
xw
λF (α∗)
¸
− S
X
α∗
λf (α∗)
,
which, after using (19) yields
γwL + (1− γ)wH − xw + xu
xw
=
1
η (xw,α∗)
·
1− S
X
xw
λF (α∗)
¸
− S
X
α∗
λf (α∗)xw
.
Dividing equations (55)-(56) by the marginal utilities on the right hand side and adding, we
obtain
λ
·
F (α∗)
v0 (xw)
+
1− F (α∗)
v0 (xu)
¸
=
SXxu
v0 (xu)
+
SXxw
v0 (xw)
,
from which, using definitions (20) and (21), we get λgX = DX , and so λ−1 = gX/DX .
Appendix E: Proofs of Section 5.4
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.
(a) Proof for eSPWU , eSPTU , eSPWE and eSPTU .
Observe that in the second best, for α < α∗L ≤ α∗H , δL (α) = δH (α) = 1, xwL (α) = xL,
xwH (α) = xH and that xL ≤ xH . For α∗L ≤ α ≤ α∗H , δL (α) = 0, and δH (α) = 1 and by
(12), v (xu) = v (xH) − α∗H , which for α∗L ≤ α ≤ α∗H gives v (xu) ≤ v (xH) − α. For α > α∗H ,
δL (α) = δH (α) = 0, and xuL (α) = x
u
H (α) = x
u.
Substituting these properties into SPWU and SPTU yields eSPWU and eSPTU , respectively.
Substituting these properties into SPWE and SPTE leads to eSPWE and eSPTE . In the procedure,
for α∗L ≤ α ≤ α∗H we use v−1 (v (xu) + α) ≤ xH from v (xu) ≤ v (xH)− α.
(b) Proof for eSPT .
Since consumption levels do not depend on α in the second best, SPT reduces to
ρmin {xL − wL, xu}+ (1− ρ)min {xH − wH , xu} .
Hence, with the ETES priority principle, the Lagrangian is
$ (xL, xH , x
u,α∗L,α
∗
H ,λ,μL,μH , ν) = ρmin {xL − wL, xu}+ (1− ρ)min {xH − wH , xu}
+λ {γF (α∗L) (wL − xL) + (1− γ)F (α∗H) (wH − xH)
− [γ (1− F (α∗L)) + (1− γ) (1− F (α∗H))]xu −R}
+μH [v(xH)− α∗H − v (xu)] + μL [v(xL)− α∗L − v (xu)] + ν (xH − xL − c)
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
(i) Suppose xL−wL ≥ xu. The first-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to xL then
becomes −λγF (α∗L) − ν = −μLv0 (xL), from which μL > 0. However, the first-order condition
with respect to α∗L gives μL = λγf (α
∗
L) (wL − xL + xu) ≤ 0 under the assumption made. Hence
we obtain a contradiction, such that we know that xL − wL < xu.
(ii) Suppose xH − wH ≥ xu. Then we get −TH ≥ xu; the high-skilled workers receive a larger
subsidy than the inactive people which cannot not be optimal. Consequently, xH − wH < xu.
As a result of (i) and (ii), the ETES priority principle reduces to ρ (xL − wL)+(1− ρ) (xH − wH).
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PROOF OF LEMMA 5.
That for all objective functions SXα∗H = 0 and that S
PT
α∗H
= SPTα∗L
= 0 is evident. Simple diﬀeren-
tiation yields SPWUα∗L =
£
ΩR (v (xL)− α∗L)− ΩR (v (xu))
¤
. Due to (10), v (xL) − α∗L = v (xu), and
so SPWUα∗L = 0. Similarly it can be shown that S
X
α∗L
= 0 for X = PTU , PWE and PTE.
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.
The proof follows the reasoning for lemma 3 (using lemma 5) so is skipped here.
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